Babylonian Talmud: Tractate Yebamoth

Folio 95a

with his wife's sister, however, presumptuous [marriage with whom does] not [cause his first wife to be] forbidden [to him] by Pentateuchal law, no preventive measure has been instituted by the Rabbis in her case where [he acted] unwittingly.¹  Whence, however, is it deduced that she²  is not forbidden?³  — [From that] which was taught: With her;⁴  only cohabitation⁵  with her causes her to be prohibited;³  cohabitation⁶  with her sister, however, does not cause her to be prohibited. [This, Scriptural text was required] since [otherwise] It might have been argued [as follows]: If where a man cohabited with [a woman forbidden by] a lighter prohibition.⁷  [the person]⁸  who caused the prohibition [itself]⁹  is forbidden [to her],¹⁰  how much more should [the person]¹¹  who caused the prohibition become forbidden in the case of cohabiting with [one¹²  forbidden by] a heavier prohibition.¹³

R. Judah stated: Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel are agreed¹⁴  that a man who cohabited with his mother-in-law renders his wife unfit [to live with him]; they only differ where a man cohabited with his wife's sister, in which case Beth Shammai maintain that thereby he causes [his wife] to be unfit for him, while Beth Hillel maintain that he does not thereby cause her to be unfit for him.

R. Jose stated: Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel are agreed¹⁴  that a man who cohabits with his wife's sister does not thereby render his wife unfit for him; they differ only where a man cohabited with his mother-in-law, in which case Beth Shammai maintain that thereby he causes [his wife] to be unfit for him, while Beth Hillel maintain that he does not thereby cause her to be unfit for him. [Both agree]¹⁵  for the following reason:¹⁶  Originally all the women of the world were permitted to him,¹⁷  and all the men of the world were permitted to her;¹⁸  but when he betrothed her he imposed a prohibition upon her and she imposed a prohibition upon him; the prohibition, however, which he imposed upon her is greater than the prohibition which she imposes upon him, since he caused all the men of the world to be forbidden to her, while she caused her relatives only to be forbidden to him. This,¹⁹  then, may be arrived at by an inference: If she, to whom he²⁰  caused²¹  all the men in the world to be prohibited, is, if she cohabited unwittingly with one who was forbidden to her,²²  not forbidden to the man²³  who was permitted to her,²⁴  how much more reason is there why he²³  to whom she²⁵  caused²⁶  the prohibition of her relatives only, should, if he cohabited unwittingly with one who was forbidden to him,²⁷  not be forbidden²⁸  to her²⁵  who was permitted to him. This argument is applicable to one who acted unwittingly. Whence is it deduced [that the same law²⁹  is applicable] to one who acted wilfully? It was expressly stated With her,³⁰  cohabitation³¹  with her only causes her to be prohibited;³²  cohabitation³³  with her sister, however, does not cause her to be prohibited.³²

Said R. Ammi in the name of Resh Lakish: What is R. Judah's reason?³⁴  — Because it is written, They shall be burnt with fire. both he and they;³⁵  is the whole household to be burned!³⁶  If this, then, is not a case for burning³⁶  regard the text as indicating a prohibition.³⁷

Rab Judah stated in the name of Samuel: The law is not in agreement with R. Judah.³⁷

A man once committed incest with his mother-in-law, and Rab Judah summoned him and ordered him to receive a flogging. 'Had Samuel not stated', he said to him, 'that the law was not in agreement with R. Judah. I would have forbidden [your wife] to you for all time'.

What was meant by a 'lighter prohibition'?³⁸  — R. Hisda replied: Remarrying one's divorced wife after her marriage to another man — 39 When that man⁴⁰  cohabited with her, he caused her to be prohibited to the other,⁴¹  and when the other⁴¹  cohabited with her⁴²  he caused her to be prohibited to the former.⁴³  [But, it may be argued,] remarrying one's divorced wife after her marriage to another man is different⁴⁴  since her body⁴⁵  was defiled and she is⁴⁶  prohibited for all time!⁴⁷  — Rather, said Resh Lakish, [it means] a yebamah.⁴⁸

A yebamah with whom?⁴⁹  If it be suggested: With a stranger,⁵⁰  [the ruling] being in accordance with R. Hamnuna who ruled⁵¹  that a woman awaiting the decision of the levir who played the harlot is forbidden to the levir,⁵²  [it may be objected that] a yebamah is different,⁴⁴  since her body was defiled and she is prohibited to the majority of men.⁵³  If, however, [it be suggested that it refers⁵⁴  to] a yebamah in relation to [her deceased husband's] brothers: Where one [brother, for instance] addressed to her a ma'amar he caused her to be prohibited to the other,⁵⁵  and when the other cohabited with her he caused her to be prohibited to the former.⁵⁶  [But in this case] what point is there, [it may be retorted, in stating]⁵⁷  that the second cohabited with her,⁵⁸  [when the same law is applicable] also even where he⁵⁹  only addressed to her a ma'amar!⁶⁰  — This is no difficulty; [a ma'amar could not be postulated], in accordance with R. Gamaliel who ruled: There is no validity in a ma'amar that was addressed after a previous ma'amar.⁶¹  But [still the objection is that the same law is applicable] even if he⁵⁹  gave her a letter of divorce and even if he submitted to her halizah! — Rather, said R. Johanan, [it means] a sotah.⁶²

A sotah, with whom?⁶³  If it be suggested: With her husband who, if he cohabited with her,⁶⁴  caused her to be prohibited to her seducer,⁶⁵  what point is there, [it may be objected, in stating] that he cohabited with her? Even if he⁶⁶  only gave her a letter of divorce and even if he only said, 'I am not allowing her to drink',⁶⁷  [the same law is applicable]!⁶⁸  [If it be suggested] however: The sotah with the seducer;⁶⁹  is this⁷⁰  [it may be objected] a 'lighter prohibition'? It is surely a grave prohibition, since she is a married woman!

1. As is the case in our Mishnah.
2. A wife whose husband has had connubial intercourse with her sister.
3. To her husband, in accordance with Pentateuchal law.
4. And a man lie with her, Num. V, 13.
5. Of a stranger.
6. Of her husband.
7. This, as will be explained infra, refers to a married woman, intercourse with whom is regarded as a comparatively lighter prohibition than that of a wife's sister (v. p. 644, n. 5), since it may at any time be raised by means of a letter of divorce severing the relationship between the husband and the wife.
8. The husband.
9. The husband causes the prohibition of his wife to all men. It is owing to his marriage with her that she is forbidden to marry any other man.
10. One must not retain a faithless wife.
11. I.e., the wife who caused the prohibition of her sister to her husband.
12. His wife's sister.
13. Since his wife causes her sister to be forbidden to him during the whole of her lifetime. Hence It was necessary to have a Scriptural text to shew that the law is not so.
14. Lit., 'did not dispute'.
15. That cohabitation with his wife's sister does not render his wife unfit to live with him.
16. Lit., 'because'.
17. The husband, before he married his wife.
18. The wife, before she married her husband.
19. V. supra n. 7.
20. Her husband.
21. By marrying her.
22. If, for instance, she was outraged.
23. Her husband.
24. Her husband. Cf. supra 56b.
25. His wife.
26. By marrying him.
27. His wife's sister.
28. 'To him' in cur. edd. is deleted with BaH.
29. V. supra p. 644, n. 7.
30. Num. V, 13. V. supra p. 643. n. 10.
31. Of a stranger.
32. To her husband.
33. Of her husband.
34. For maintaining that both Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel agree that a man's cohabitation with his mother-in-law causes his wife to be prohibited to him.
35. Lev. XX, 14. Cf. supra p. 642, n. 9.
36. His first wife, surely, who was lawfully married, should not suffer because her husband bad subsequently contracted an unlawful marriage!
37. V. supra note 13.
38. Spoken of supra.
39. Which is a 'lighter prohibition'. being only a prohibitory law which involves no kareth. V. infra p. 646, n. I.
40. Her second husband.
41. Her first husband.
42. After her second husband had divorced her.
43. V. supra p. 645, n. 18, the prohibition being due to the prohibitory law in Deut. XXIV, 4. Thus the second husband 'who caused the prohibition of his wife is thereby himself forbidden to her'.
44. From a marriage with one's wife's sister.
45. That of the divorced woman.
46. Cur. edd., insert, 'and she is prohibited to the majority' which (cf. Rashi a.l.) is to be deleted.
47. To both husbands. A wife's sister, however, is forbidden only during the lifetime of one's wife but permitted after her death, while furthermore the marriage of a wife's sister does not cause the defilement of the wife's body. The latter case cannot, therefore, be compared to the former. What, then, was meant by the 'lighter prohibition'?
48. Marriage with her by a stranger is regarded as a 'lighter prohibition'.
49. I.e., with whom did she cohabit that her act should have the result that he 'who caused the prohibition is thereby himself forbidden to her'?
50. The prohibition to marry whom, before she had performed the halizah, is only a prohibitory law involving no kareth.
51. Supra 81a, 92b, Cit. 80b, Sot. 18b.
52. Thus the levir 'who caused the prohibition' of his sister-in-law to others is 'himself forbidden to her' by the cohabitation of the stranger.
53. I.e., to everybody except the levir or levirs. A wife's sister, however, is forbidden to him (her sister's husband) alone, and his wife's body is not defiled by his marriage with her sister. The two cases, therefore, cannot be compared.
54. Cf. supra note 6.
55. Brother, this being regarded as a 'lighter prohibition', since it is due to a Rabbinic measure only.
56. Cf. supra note so, mutatis mutandis.
57. Supra.
58. I.e., that be prohibits her to the first only because he cohabited with her.
59. The second brother.
60. He should still thereby prohibit her to the first brother, in view of the ruling supra 50a that a ma'amar is effective after a ma'amar.
61. Supra 50a.
62. V. Glos. Cohabitation with a sotah is regarded as the 'lighter prohibition'.
63. V. supra p. 646, n. 7.
64. After she had been warned by him against intimacy with a stranger, and after she had met that stranger privately, when all connubial intercourse between the woman and her husband is forbidden.
65. Even after his own death or after he had divorced her. Thus, the seducer 'who caused the prohibition' of the woman to her husband becomes 'himself forbidden' to her for all time.
66. Her husband.
67. The water of bitterness (cf. Num. V, 18). V. supra n. 6.
68. She becomes forbidden to the seducer for all time. Cf. supra n' 7.
69. By his cohabitation the woman becomes prohibited to her husband who was the cause of her prohibition to others.
70. Cohabitation with a married woman.

— Rather, said Raba, it means a married woman. Similarly when Rabin came¹  he stated in the name of R. Johanan: A married woman. But why should this²  be described as 'a lighter prohibition'? — Because [her husband] who causes her to be prohibited [to other men] does not cause her to be so prohibited during the whole of his lifetime.³

It⁴  was taught likewise: Abba Hanan stated in the name of R. Eleazar: [It means] a married man. [And the argument runs thus:] If where a man cohabits with [a woman forbidden by] a lighter prohibition,⁵  in which case he⁶  who caused the prohibition of her does not cause her to be prohibited during the whole of his lifetime,⁷  [it is nevertheless ruled] that the very person who causes the prohibition becomes prohibited,⁸  then, in a case of cohabiting with [one forbidden] by a graver prohibition,⁹  where the person, who causes the prohibition of her,¹⁰  prohibits her during the whole of her lifetime,¹¹  how much more should we rule that the very person who causes the prohibition should become prohibited;¹²  hence it was expressly stated, With her,¹³  only cohabition¹⁴  with her¹⁵  causes her to be prohibited¹⁶  but cohabitation¹⁷  with her sister does not cause her¹⁸  to be prohibited.¹⁶

R. JOSE STATED: WHOSOEVER DISQUALIFIES etc. What does R. Jose mean?¹⁹  If it be suggested that while the first Tanna implied that 'Where a man's wife and his brother-in-law²⁰  went to a country beyond the sea,²¹  the wife of his brother- in-law is forbidden,²²  though his own wife is permitted',²³  R. Jose said to him, 'As his own wife is permitted²³  so is the wife of his brother-in-law also permitted';²²  if so, [it may be objected, why the expression] WHOSOEVER DOES NOT DISQUALIFY FOR OTHERS DOES NOT DISQUALIFY FOR HIMSELF²⁴  where it should have been. 'Whosoever does not disqualify²⁵  for himself, does not disqualify for others'!²⁶

If, however, [it be suggested that R. Jose implied]. 'As the wife of his brother-in-law is forbidden,²⁷  so is his wife also forbidden',²⁸  [the expression,] WHOSOEVER DISQUALIFIES would be satisfactorily explained; what, however, would be the purport of WHOSOEVER DOES NOT DISQUALIFY?²⁴  — R. Ammi replied: [He²⁹  refers] to an earlier clause:³⁰  'If she married with the authorization of the Beth din, she must leave, but is exempt from an offering. If she married, however, without the authorization of the Beth din, she must leave and is also liable to an offering, the authorization of the Beth din is thus more effective in that it exempts her from the offering.³¹  Concerning this, the first Tanna stated [that his wife may return to him]³²  'irrespective of whether [the marriage³³  took place] on the evidence of two witnesses,³⁴  where the wife of his brother-in-law is permitted,³⁵  or whether [it took place] in accordance with a decision of the Beth din,³⁶  where the wife of his brother-in- law is forbidden',³⁵  and [to this] R. Jose replied. '[If the marriage took place] in accordance with a decision of the Beth din,³⁶  where he DISQUALIFIES FOR OTHERS³⁷  he DISQUALIFIES FOR HIMSELF;³⁸  [if, however, it took place] on the basis of the evidence of two witnesses,³⁴  where he DOES NOT DISQUALIFY FOR OTHERS³⁹  he DOES NOT DISQUALIFY FOR HIMSELF.⁴⁰

R. Isaac Nappaha replied: [R. Jose may], in fact, refer to the latter clause,⁴¹  one⁴²  [of his rulings applying] where [the persons who] had gone [were] the man's wife⁴³  and his brother-in-law. and the other [applying] where his betrothed and brother-in-law had gone. The first Tanna having ruled that 'irrespective of whether it was his wife and his brother-in-law or whether it was his betrothed and his brother-in-law, the wife of his brother-in-law is forbidden⁴⁴  while his wife is permitted,'⁴⁵  R. Jose said to him, 'In the case of his wife and brother-in-law where no one would assume that he had attached some condition to his marriage⁴⁶  and where consequently he does not cause [his sister-in-law] to be prohibited to the other,⁴⁷  he does not cause [his first wife] to be prohibited to him either; in the case of his betrothed and his brother-in-law, however, where someone might assume that he had attached some condition to his betrothal⁴⁸  and where, in consequence, he causes [his sister- in-law] to be prohibited to the other,⁴⁹  he causes [his first wife] also to be prohibited to him.

Rab Judah Stated in the name of Samuel: The halachah is in agreement with R. Jose.

R. Joseph demurred: Could Samuel have said this?⁵⁰  Surely it was stated: A yebamah,⁵¹  Rab said, has the status of a married woman; and Samuel said: She has not the status of a married woman. And R. Huna said: Where, for instance, a man's brother betrothed a woman⁵²  and then went to a country beyond the sea, and he,⁵³  on hearing that his brother was dead, married his wife. [It is in such a case] that Rab ruled that 'she has the status of a married woman' and is consequently forbidden to the brother-inlaw;⁵⁴  and Samuel ruled that 'she has not the status of a married woman' and is, therefore, permitted to him!⁵⁵  Said Abaye to him:⁵⁶  Whence [do you infer] that when Samuel stated that 'the halachah is in agreement with R. Jose', he was referring to R. Isaac Nappaha's interpretation? Is it not possible that he was referring to that of R. Ammi!⁵⁷  And even if he refers to that of R. Isaac Nappaha, whence the proof that [he referred to the ruling] 'DISQUALIFIED'?⁵⁸

1. From Palestine to Babylon.
2. Illicit intercourse with a married woman.
3. As soon as be divorces her she is free again. A prohibition of this nature, which may terminate at any time, is regarded as 'lighter' than the prohibition of a man's wife's sister, which remains in force throughout the whole of the lifetime of his wife.
4. The lighter prohibition referred to.
5. A married woman. The prohibition is considered light for the reason that follows.
6. The husband.
7. The prohibition of a married woman terminates with divorce by her husband.
8. The woman becomes forbidden to her own husband through illicit intercourse.
9. His wife's sister.
10. I.e., the wife who causes her sister to be prohibited to her husband.
11. The prohibition [If a man's wife's sister remains in force throughout the whole of the lifetime of his wife.
12. To her own husband.
13. Num. V, 13.
14. Of a stranger
15. His wife.
16. To her husband.
17. Of her husband.
18. The wife.
19. His statement seems to have no apparent connection with the preceding clause.
20. His wife's sister's husband.
21. And they both returned after be had married his wife's sister on the strength of the evidence of one witness who testified that they were both dead.
22. To her husband, his brother-in-law.
23. To him.
24. Cases about which R. Jose, according to this suggestion, did not speak.
25. His own wife.
26. His wife's sister to her husband. These last mentioned cases being those of which R. Jose presumably spoke.
27. To her husband, his brother-in- law.
28. To him.
29. R. Jose.
30. In a previous Mishnah.
31. V. supra 87b.
32. V. our Mishnah, first clause.
33. Of the husband (whose wife had gone away) with his wife's sister (whose husband also bad gone away).
34. Who testified that both his wife and brother-in-law were dead.
35. To her husband, if be returned.
36. On the evidence of one witness. V. supra n. 11.
37. He causes his wife's sister to be forbidden to return to her husband owing to his illicit marriage with her.
38. His first wife is forbidden to him also.
39. His wife's sister being in this case permitted to her husband.
40. And his first wife may return to him.
41. I.e., our Mishnah which speaks of a marriage permitted on the evidence of one witness.
42. Lit., 'that'. Cur. edd. insert in parenthesis 'that, where he married the wife of his brother-in-law; and that, where he married the betrothed of his brother-in-law.'
43. This is the reading of Rashi (a.l. s.v. d"v). Cur. edd., transpose 'wife' and 'betrothed'.
44. To her husband, if be returned.
45. To him.
46. With his first wife; since no condition is admissible in a marriage contract. (V., however, supra p. 642, n. 5).
47. Her husband, his brother-in-law. His own first marriage being known to be valid it should be obvious to all that his subsequent marriage with his sister-in-law was invalid. Were it even assumed that his brother-in-law had divorced her, the invalidity of his marriage with his sister-in-law would not thereby be affected since even after her divorce she still remains forbidden to him as his wife's sister. This being the case no one will suspect his brother-in-law when his wife returns to him of having remarried his divorcee. Hence R. Jose's ruling that she is not forbidden to her husband.
48. Which, on non-fulfilment, had rendered the betrothal invalid and thus enabled him lawfully to contract his subsequent marriage; his presumed sister-in-law being to him (owing to the invalidity of her sister's betrothal) no more than a mere stranger.
49. Her former husband. Were she permitted to return to him it might be assumed that he had divorced her prior to her marriage with her brother-in-law and that the latter had now divorced her; and so it would be concluded that (contrary to Deut. XXIV, 4) a man married again the woman he had once divorced though she had in the meantime been married to another man.
50. Lit., 'thus', that the halachah is in agreement with the full statement of R. Jose, including the part relating to the marriage with the sister of one's betrothed, it being necessary in case of betrothal to provide against the erroneous assumption that the betrothal was invalid and that consequently a man's divorcee had been married again by him. Cf. p. 650, nn. 8 and 9.
51. This is explained anon.
52. Had he married her there would have been no question that she may return to him. Cf. supra p. 650, n. 7.
53. The brother at home.
54. I.e., to the man who first betrothed her and then left her and now returned, and who, owing to his brother's marriage with her, has become her brother-in-law. Were she to be permitted to return to him it might be assumed that his original betrothal was invalid owing to some disqualifying condition, that his brother's marriage was, therefore, valid, and that be now married his brother's wife.
55. Because, in the opinion of Samuel, no provision need be made against the erroneous assumption that the betrothal was invalid (cf. supra n. 5). How, then, could it be said that Samuel adopted the complete statement of R. Jose.
56. R. Joseph.
57. So that the question of the assumption of a disqualifying condition in a betrothal would not at all arise.
58. The case of one's betrothed and brother-in-law.