Babylonian Talmud: Tractate Yebamoth

Folio 88a

on what grounds do the Rabbis declare the man liable?¹  If it be suggested: Because he²  is believed; surely [here it may be objected], even in the case of two witnesses, who in all other cases are trusted though the accused contradicts them, the Rabbis have exempted him!³  The reason⁴  must consequently be⁵  because the accused remained silent, and silence is regarded as admission!⁶

[The fact], however, [is that this⁷  is arrived at] by⁸  a logical inference, this case being analogous to that of a piece of fat⁹  concerning which there is doubt as to whether it was of the forbidden,¹⁰  or of the permitted kind; if a single witness came and declared, 'l am certain that it was permitted fat', he is trusted.¹¹  Are [the two cases] similar? There¹²  the prohibition¹³  was not established; here¹⁴  the prohibition of a married woman is established,¹⁵  and no question of sexual relationship [may be decided on the evidence of] less than two witnesses! This¹⁶  is rather analogous¹⁷  to the case of a piece that was definitely forbidden fat;¹⁸  if a single witness came and declared, 'I am certain that it was permitted fat,' he is not believed.¹⁹  But are these cases, similar? In that case,²⁰  should even a hundred witnesses come they would not be believed; in this case,¹⁶  however, since should two witnesses come they would be trusted, one witness also should be trusted! This¹⁶  is rather analogous to the cases of tebel,²¹  and consecrated and konam²¹  objects.²²

Whose tebel²¹  is here to be understood? If his own,²³  [he would naturally be trusted] since it is in his power to make it fit for use;²⁴  if, however, it is that of another person, [the question may still be urged], what view is here adopted: If it is maintained that a man who sets apart priestly dues for his neighbours' produce out of his own does not require the owner s consent [it is quite obvious why the witness is here trusted] since it is in his power to make it fit for use;²⁴  and if it is maintained that the owner's consent is required and that the witness declares, 'I know that he has made it fit for use', whence is this very law²⁵  derived? As regards consecrated objects also, if it was a consecration of the value of an object [it is obvious why one witness is trusted] since it is in his power to redeem it;²⁶  but if an object has been consecrated,²⁷  [the objection may still be raised]: If it were his own²³  [he would naturally be trusted] since it is within his right to ask for the disallowance of his vow;²⁸  if, however, it belonged to another man, and the witness declared, 'I know that its owner has asked for the disallowance of his vow', whence is this very law²⁹  derived? With reference to konam³⁰  objects also, if it is maintained that the law of trespass³¹  is applicable to konam objects and that the sanctity of their value³²  descends upon them [it is obvious why one witness is trusted] since it is within his power to redeem them;³³  and if it is maintained that the law of trespass³¹  is not applicable to konam objects³⁴  and that it is only a mere prohibition with which he is saddled³⁵  [the question may be urged]: If any such object was his own [it is natural that he should be trusted] since it is within his power to ask for the disallowance of his vow;³⁶  if, however, it belonged to another man, and the witness declared, 'I know that its owner has asked for the disallowance of his vow, whence is this very law³⁷  derived?

R. Zera replied:³⁸  Owing to the rigidity of the disabilities³⁹  that were later⁴⁰  imposed upon her the law was relaxed in her favour at the beginning.⁴¹  Let there be, however, neither rigid disabilities nor a relaxation of the law! — In order [to avoid] perpetual desertion⁴²  the Rabbis have relaxed the law in her favour.⁴³

MUST … LEAVE THE ONE AS WELL AS THE OTHER etc. Rab stated: This was taught only in respect [of a woman] who married on the evidence of a single witness, but if she married on the strength of the evidence of two witnesses, she need not leave.⁴⁴  In the West⁴⁵  they laughed at him. 'Her husband' [they remarked] comes, and there he stands, and you say: She need not leave!' — This⁴⁶  [it may be replied] was required only in the case when the man⁴⁷  was not known.⁴⁸  If he⁴⁹  is unknown, why is she to leave [her second husband] even where she only married on the evidence of a single witness? This is required only in the case where two witnesses came and stated, 'We were with him⁴⁹  from the moment he left until now, but you it is who are unable to recognize him';⁵⁰  as it is written, And Joseph knew his brethren but they knew him not,⁵¹  on which R. Hisda remarked: This teaches that he went forth without any marks⁵²  of a beard and now he appeared with a full⁵²  beard. But, after all, there are two⁵³  against two

1. To an offering, if he did not contradict the evidence.
2. The one witness.
3. Because his word is more than the evidence of two witnesses. How much more then should he be trusted when the evidence is only that of one witness!
4. For the obligation of a sin-offering in the first clause.
5. Lit., 'but not'.
6. The original question then arises again: Whence is it proved that the evidence of one witness is admissible?
7. Cf. supra n. 12.
8. Lit., 'but'.
9. Which someone has eaten.
10. For the unwitting eating of which a sin-offering is incurred.
11. Cf. Git. 2b.
12. Where the nature of the fat is in doubt.
13. Of the piece.
14. The case of the woman spoken of in our Mishnah.
15. The doubt extending only to the question as to whether by the death of the husband this prohibition had been removed.
16. The case of the woman spoken of in our Mishnah
17. Lit., 'this is not like, but'.
18. Which someone has eaten.
19. The question, therefore, remains whence is it inferred that the evidence of one witness is admissible.
20. Where the forbidden nature of the fat is established.
21. V. Glos.
22. Where the evidence of a single witness is accepted though the prohibitions were established. From such a case that of the woman in our Mishnah may reasonably be inferred.
23. That of the witness.
24. He can at any moment set apart the priestly dues and thus render the produce fit for everybody's consumption Such an argument is, of course, inapplicable to the case in our Mishnah.
25. That the evidence of a single witness is accepted in such a case.
26. Objects of which the value only has been consecrated [H] completely lose their sanctity on redemption. Cf. supra n. 9.
27. [H] consecrated for the altar. Such cannot be redeemed.
28. A learned man may under certain conditions disallow the vow, and the object would consequently lose its sanctity. Cf. supra p. 597, n. 9.
29. That the evidence of a single witness is accepted in such a case.
30. V. Glos.
31. Me'ilah, v. Glos.
32. Which is consecrated for Temple purposes.
33. Cf. supra p. 597, n. 9.
34. Konam being regarded as a vow only, which the man has to fulfil by paying to the Temple treasury the value of the object which itself remains unconsecrated.
35. Lit., 'that rides upon his shoulder'.
36. V. supra note 2.
37. V. supra note 2.
38. To the question raised supra to the admissibility of the evidence of a single witness in the case of the woman in our Mishnah.
39. Loss of kethubah, usufruct, etc.
40. If her husband returns.
41. By permitting her to marry on the evidence of a single witness. Knowing the disabilities to which she would be subject should her first husband return, she takes every precaution to verify the evidence of the one witness.
42. [H] lit., 'holding fast', description of a deserted woman who remains tied to her absent husband.
43. And allowed her to marry on the strength of the evidence of one witness.
44. It is now assumed that Rab referred to the second husband,
45. Palestine.
46. Rab's ruling.
47. Her first husband.
48. To have been her husband.
49. The first husband.
50. Because he left while still young and now he has attained to manhood. Such evidence is accepted if the evidence of the husband's death was given by one witness only. It is not accepted, however, where it is contradictory to the evidence of two witnesses on the basis of whose testimony the woman had married her second husband.
51. Gen. XLII, 8.
52. Construct of [H] 'mark' or 'stamp'. [H] 'The mature manly expression which the beard gives, full manhood' (Jast.).
53. Witnesses.

and he who cohabits with her¹  is liable to bring an asham talui!²  R. Shesheth replied:³  When she was married, for instance, to one of her witnesses.⁴  But she herself is liable to an asham talui!⁵  — Where³  she states, 'I am certain',⁶  If so, what need was there to state [such an obvious ruling], when even R. Menahem son of R. Jose⁷  maintained his view only where the witnesses⁸  came first and the woman married afterwards, but not⁹  where she married first and the witnesses came afterwards! For it was taught: If two witnesses state that he¹⁰  was dead and two state that he was not dead, or if two state that the woman was divorced and two state that she was not divorced, the woman must not marry again, but if she married she need not leave;¹¹  R. Menahem, son of R. Jose, however, ruled that she must leave.¹⁰  Said R. Menahem son of R. Jose, 'When do I rule that she must leave? Only when witnesses came first and she married afterwards, but where she married first and the witnesses came afterwards, she need not leave!'¹²  — Rab also spoke of the case where witnesses came first and the woman married afterwards, [his object being] to exclude the ruling of R. Menahem son of R. Jose.

Another reading: The reason then¹³  is because she married first and the witnesses came afterwards,¹⁴  but where witnesses came first and the woman married afterwards, she must leave. In accordance with whose [view is this ruling]? — In accordance with that of R. Menahem son of R. Jose.

Raba raised an objection: Whence is it deduced that if [a priest] refused¹⁵  he is to be compelled?¹⁶  It was expressly stated, And thou shalt sanctify him,¹⁷  even against his will. Now, how is this¹⁸  to be understood?¹⁹  If it be suggested [that it is a case] where she was not married to one of her witnesses²⁰  and she does not plead 'I am certain',²¹  is there any need to state that he is to be compelled?²²  Consequently it must refer to a case²³  where she was married to one of her witnesses²⁴  and she pleads, 'I am certain'; I and yet it was stated that he was to be compelled;²⁵  from which it clearly follows that she is to be taken away from him!²⁶  — A priestly prohibition is different.²⁷  If you prefer I might say,²⁸  'What is the meaning of "he is to be compelled"? He is to be compelled by means of witnesses'.²⁹  And if you prefer I might say:²⁸  [It is a case] where witnesses came first and she married afterwards, and this represents the view of R. Menahem son of R. Jose.³⁰  R. Ashi replied. What is meant by the expression, 'She need not leave' which Rab used? She is not to depart from her first state of permissibility.³¹  But surely Rab has said this once! For we learned, IF SHE MARRIED WITHOUT AN AUTHORIZATION SHE MAY RETURN TO HIM, and Rab Huna stated in the name of Rab: This is the established law!³²  — One was stated as an inference from, the other.³³

Samuel said: This³⁴  was taught only in the case where she does not contradict him,³⁵  but where she contradicts him she need not leave.

What [are the circumstances] spoken of? If it be suggested that there are two witnesses,³⁶  of what avail is her denial?³⁷  [It must then deal with the case] of one witness, and the reason³⁸  is because she contradicts him;³⁹  had she, however, remained silent, she would have been obliged to leave. But, surely, 'Ulla stated that 'wherever the Torah allows credence to one witness⁴⁰  he is regarded as two witnesses, and the evidence of one man⁴¹  against that of two men has no validity!'⁴²  — Here it is a case of evidence by ineligible witnesses,⁴³  and [Samuel's statement is] in accordance with the view of R. Nehemiah. For it was taught: R. Nehemiah stated, 'Wherever the Torah allows credence to one witness⁴⁰  the majority of opinions is to be followed,⁴⁴  and [the evidence of] two women against that of one man is given the same validity as that of two men against one man'.⁴⁵

And if you prefer I might reply: Wherever one eligible witness came first,⁴⁶  even a hundred women⁴⁷  are regarded as one witness;⁴⁸  here, however, we are dealing with a case where a woman witness came in the first instance;⁴⁹  and the statement of R. Nehemiah is to be explained thus: R. Nehemiah stated, 'Wherever the Torah allows credence to one witness, the majority of opinions is to be followed, and [the evidence of] two women against that of one woman is given the same validity as that of two men against one man, but that of two women against that of one man is regarded only as that of a half and a half.⁵⁰

SHE ALSO REQUIRES A LETTER OF DIVORCE FROM ONE AS WELL AS FROM THE OTHER. It is quite intelligible that she should require a divorce from the first husband; but why also from the second [when their union was a] mere act of adultery?⁵¹  — R. Huna replied: This⁵²  is a preventive measure against the possibility of assuming that the first had divorced her and the second had [lawfully] married her, and that consequently⁵³  a married woman⁵⁴  may leave her husband without a letter of divorce. If so,⁵⁵  in the latter clause also, where it was stated, 'If she was told "your husband is dead", and she was betrothed, and afterwards her husband came, she is permitted to return to him',⁵⁶  might it not be assumed there also that the first husband had divorced her and the other had [lawfully] betrothed her and that consequently a betrothed woman may be released without a letter of divorce! — As a matter of fact she does require a letter of divorce.⁵⁷  If so,⁵⁸  [it might there also be assumed that] the first had again married his divorced wife after she had been betrothed!⁵⁹  — [This statement is in] accordance with R. Jose b. Kiper who stated [that remarrying one's divorced wife] after a marriage⁶⁰  is forbidden but after a betrothal⁶⁰  is permitted.⁶¹  Since, however, it was stated in the final clause, 'Although

1. And thus commits a doubtful sin, it being uncertain which pair of witnesses is to be trusted.
2. V. Glos. Such an offering is brought for the commission of a doubtful sin. How, then, could Rab maintain that she may continue to live with her second husband?
3. Rab's ruling is applicable.
4. Who well knows that her first husband is dead.
5. Since as far as she is concerned her first husband's death is still a matter of doubt.
6. That the man who claims to be her first husband is a stranger. An asham talui is brought only in cases where a person is himself in doubt as to the propriety of an act he has committed; v. Keth. Sonc. ed., p. 122 notes.
7. Who in a similar case maintained (v. infra) that the woman must leave her second husband.
8. Who testified that the first husband was alive.
9. Lit., 'he did not say'.
10. The woman's first husband.
11. Her second husband
12. V. Keth. 22b. What need, then, was there for Rab's ruling?
13. Why Rab allowed the woman to remain with her second husband though two witnesses stated that her first husband was still alive.
14. As in the case in our Mishnah in connection with which Rab's statement was made.
15. To observe the rules of levitical uncleanness and matrimony prescribed in Lev. XXI, 1ff.
16. [H] rt. [H] 'to strike on the side' (cf. [H] 'side', 'wall').
17. Ibid. 8.
18. Case of coercion.
19. Since a Scriptural text was required for the purpose, it could not apply to established or even doubtful prohibitions which a priest must undoubtedly obey and the observance of which is obviously to be enforced.
20. Who was a priest.
21. Cf. supra p. 599, n. 16.
22. V. supra p. 600, n. 13.
23. Lit., 'but not?'
24. Who was a priest.
25. To separate from her if witnesses subsequently came and declared that the first husband was still alive at the time this second marriage with the priest took place.
26. How then could Rab rule that in the case of contradictory evidence between two pairs of witnesses the second union is not to be severed if it took place prior to the appearance of the second pair.
27. A priest is subject to greater restrictions which do not apply to others.
28. In reply to Raba's objection.
29. Before marriage with the priest is allowed, the court makes every effort to ascertain whether witnesses are available who could contradict the evidence of the first witnesses and thus prevent the marriage. If, however, no such witnesses are available and the marriage has taken place, the union need not be severed though such witnesses subsequently appeared.
30. With which Rab is in agreement.
31. She may return to her first husband, because in her second marriage she is a victim of circumstances, it having been contracted on misleading evidence.
32. Infra 91a; why should the same ruling be stated twice?
33. Rab, however, gave his ruling only once.
34. That the woman must … LEAVE THE ONE AS WELL AS THE OTHER. (V. our Mishnah).
35. The man who claims to be her husband.
36. Who testify to the veracity of the statement of the man who claims to be the first husband.
37. Lit., 'when she contradicts him, what is?'; her word would obviously not be accepted against the word of two witnesses.
38. Why the woman may continue to live with her second husband.
39. The evidence that her first husband was alive.
40. In certain cases of marriage and divorce, testifying, for instance, that a husband was dead.
41. Who now states that the first husband was not dead.
42. The previous evidence of the one witness being consequently valid, why should the woman have to leave even when she does not contradict the latter evidence?
43. Relatives, women or slaves, for instance, two of whom testify that the first husband is alive.
44. Since one witness is trusted, the accepted law of valid evidence is superseded in such cases and the evidence of any ineligible witnesses (cf. supra n. 8) is equally admissible.
45. Infra 117b, Sot. 31b. When, therefore, the wife does not contradict the evidence, these otherwise ineligible witnesses are trusted. Where, however, she contradicts them, her evidence is added to that of the one witness who had originally testified that her husband was dead, and the evidence of the second pair of witnesses, being thus contradicted by two, is disregarded. Cf. Maimonides cited by Wilna Gaon, glosses.
46. And testified that the first husband was dead.
47. I.e., ineligible witnesses who, after the woman had married, testified that her first husband was alive.
48. And their evidence, being opposed to that of the first witness, is disregarded, as is the case with all evidence of a single witness, which is opposed to that of a previous witness. The woman need not, therefore, leave her second husband even if she does not contradict the second set of witnesses.
49. V. supra p. 602, n. 11, and two women subsequently testified that the first husband was alive. If the wife keeps silent, there remains a majority of two against one; if she contradicts the two the majority disappears.
50. The two together representing one; so that the evidence of the first eligible witness remains unaffected by it, provided the woman remarried, even where she remained silent.
51. The first husband having been alive when it was contracted.
52. The requirement of a divorce from the second husband.
53. Lit., 'and it is found'.
54. The marriage with the second being assumed to have been valid.
55. That provision was made against erroneous assumptions.
56. Infra 92a.
57. From the second, to whom she was betrothed.
58. That a letter of divorce is required.
59. Cf. supra note 6 mutatis mutandis.
60. With a second husband.
61. Cf. supra 11b.