Babylonian Talmud: Tractate Yebamoth

Folio 58a

According to R. Meir who holds that the betrothal causes ineligibility, the bridal chamber¹  also causes ineligibility, while according to R. Eleazar and R. Simeon who maintain that betrothal causes no ineligibility the bridal chamber also causes no ineligibility. But whence [is this proved]? Is it not possible that R. Meir advanced his view only there, in respect of betrothal, whereby kinyan is effected, but not in respect of the bridal chamber whereby no kinyan is effected!²  Or else: R. Eleazar and R. Simeon may have advanced their view there only, in respect of betrothal, since it is not close to the act of intercourse; but the bridal chamber which is close to the act of intercourse, may well cause ineligibility.

But if anything can be said³  [it is, that the question⁴  depends] on the dispute between the following Tannaim: For it was taught, 'This class or that, [viz.,] eligible or ineligible women, who were married [to a priest], or who only entered [with him] into the bridal chamber without any intercourse having taken place, are entitled to sustenance from his estate and are also permitted to eat terumah'. 'Who only entered [etc.]' implies that 'were married' means that they were actually married!⁵  Must it not [consequently be concluded that the meaning is], 'as, for instance,⁶  when they entered the bridal chamber without any intercourse having taken place'? And yet it was stated that 'they are entitled to sustenance from his estate and are also permitted to eat terumah'.⁷  R. Ishmael son of R. Johanan b. Beroka said: Any woman whose cohabitation entitles her to the eating of terumah is also entitled to the eating of it through her entry into the bridal chamber, and any woman upon whom cohabitation does not confer the right to eat terumah is not entitled through her entry into the bridal chamber also to the eating of it.⁸

Whence, [however, the proof]? Is it not possible that R. Ishmael son of R. Johanan b. Beroka is of the same opinion as R. Meir, who maintains that through betrothal alone a woman is not entitled to eat! — Instead, then, of the statement 'Any woman upon whom cohabitation does not confer the right to eat terumah is not entitled through her entry into the bridal chamber also to the eating of it', the statement should have run, 'Any woman upon whom cohabitation does not confer the right to eat terumah, is not entitled through her money⁹  also to the eating of terumah'. But is it not possible that as the first Tanna spoke of the bridal chamber he also spoke of the bridal chamber!

R. Amram stated, The following ruling was given to us by R. Shesheth and he threw light on the subject¹⁰  from a Mishnah: The bridal chamber constitutes kinyan with ineligible women.¹¹  And the following Tanna taught the same thing:¹²  'Amen¹³  that I¹⁴  have not gone aside¹⁵  as a betrothed, as a married woman, as one awaiting the decision of the levir or as one taken [by the levir]'.¹⁶  Now, how is one to imagine the case of the 'betrothed'? If it be suggested that she was one who was warned¹⁷  while she was betrothed, and then she secluded herself¹⁸  and is now made to drink¹⁹  while she is still only betrothed; is a betrothed [it may be asked] subject to the drinking? Surely we learned: A betrothed or one awaiting the decision of a levir neither drinks²⁰  nor receives a kethubah!²¹  Should it, however, [be suggested that she is one] who was warned while she was betrothed, and then she secluded herself,²²  and is now made to drink when she is already married; do the waters [it may be asked] test her? Surely it was taught: And the man shall be clear from iniquity,²³  only when the man is 'clear from iniquity' do the waters test his wife; when, however, the man is not 'clear from iniquity'²⁴  the waters do not test his wife!²⁵  Consequently [she²⁶  must be one] who was warned while she was betrothed and then she secluded herself,²²  and subsequently entered the bridal chamber but there was no cohabitation. Thus²⁷  it may be inferred that the bridal chamber alone constitutes kinyan²⁸  with ineligible women.²⁹  Said Raba: Do you think that this³⁰  is an authenticated statement?³¹  Surely when R. Aha b. Hanina³²  arrived from the South, he came and brought a Baraitha with him: Besides thy husband,³³  only when the cohabitation of the husband preceded that of the adulterer, but not when the cohabitation of the adulterer preceded that of the husband! Rami b. Hama replied: This³⁴  is possible where, for instance, he³⁵  cohabited with her while she was only betrothed and still in the house of her father. Similarly in respect of the woman awaiting the decision of the levir³⁶  [it must obviously be a case] where the man cohabited with her in the house of her father-in-law!³⁷

1. Even in the absence of betrothal.
2. The bridal chamber alone without the additional kinyan of money, deed, or cohabitation is of no validity. V. Kid. 5a.
3. On the lines of Rami b. Hama's statement.
4. Whether the bridal chamber constitutes kinyan with ineligible women. (Cf. supra p. 385, nn. 11 and 13).
5. Otherwise both expressions would have meant exactly the same classes. But this meaning is impossible in view of the fact that after actual marriage it is unanimously agreed that the woman is ineligible to eat terumah!
6. I.e., the expression 'or', [H] is to be understood as the equivalent of 'as for instance' [H], and the clause following is an illustration of the preceding one.
7. Which proves that, even where the union was a forbidden one, the entry into the bridal chamber alone does not deprive a woman of the right of eating terumah if she was previously entitled to it.
8. If she was the daughter of an Israelite (v. Keth. 57a). As the bridal chamber and cohabitation are in this case placed on the same level, it follows that in the case of the daughter of a priest also, if she loses her right to the terumah by cohabitation, she also loses it by entry into the bridal chamber. Thus it has been shewn that the question referred to by Rami b. Hama is a matter of dispute between the first Tanna and R. Ishmael son of R. Johanan b. Broka.
9. The token of betrothal.
10. Lit., 'and he lit up our eyes'.
11. Cf. supra p. 385, nn. 11 and 13.
12. [H]. supra p. 378, n. 3.
13. As the term was repeated (v. Num. V, 22) it includes all the following.
14. I.e., the sotah who confirms the declaration (v. Num. V, 19).
15. 'Have not been faithless'. Cf. ibid. vv. 19, 20.
16. Where the levir suspects her of infidelity, v. Sotah 18a, Kid. 27b.
17. That she must not hold secret meetings with a certain man.
18. With the man. V. BaH. Cur. edd. omit, 'and then … herself'.
19. The 'water of bitterness (cf. Num. V, 18 and ibid. 17).
20. The 'water of bitterness' (cf. Num. V, 18 and ibid. 17.
21. If she secluded herself with the suspected man and if, in consequence of this, she is divorced by her husband. V. Sotah 23b, Kid. 27b, Sifre, Nasso,
22. With the suspected man, during the period of her betrothal.
23. Num. V, 31.
24. As in this case where he married her, despite her intimacy with the suspected man during her betrothal which had caused her prohibition to him.
25. Sotah 28a, 47b, Shebu. 5a, Kid. 27b.
26. The betrothed spoken of,
27. Since the woman is subjected to the test of the water though no cohabitation had taken place.
28. In the absence of cohabitation. Had not the bridal chamber constituted the kinyan, which brought the woman within the category of marriage, she would not have been subject to the test to which a married woman only must submit. (Cf. Num. V, 19, being under thy husband).
29. Among whom the Sotah is, of course, included. Cf. supra n. 5.
30. The Mishnah cited by R. Shesheth.
31. [H] (rt. [H], 'to be right'), a version the correctness of which has been upheld by refuting all objections raised against it.
32. Cf. supra 57a where the reading is 'Hinena'.
33. Num. V, 20.
34. The Mishnah cited by R. Shesheth.
35. The husband.
36. Since in her case also the cohabitation of the levir must precede that of the adulterer. Alternatively: Since she also is not subject to the test of the water.
37. So that his cohabitation took place prior to that of the suspected adulterer, which was also preceded by the warning of the levir and followed by the bridal chamber but by no cohabitation; and the woman is submitted to the test of the water of bitterness in respect of her suspected act during her betrothal! Alternatively: Since in her case, unlike that of the betrothed, the kinyan of the bridal chamber is not applicable.

Why then, do you call her 'a woman awaiting the decision of the levir' [when such a woman] is in fact his proper wife, since Rab had stated, 'kinyan is constituted in all respects'?¹  — [The Mishnah is] in accordance with the view of Samuel who stated, 'Kinyan is constituted only in respect of the things specified in the section'.²

Is not this³  adduced only as a reason and support for the opinion of Rab?⁴  And Rab, surely, had said that 'Kinyan is constituted in all respects'!⁵  — Here we are concerned with a case where for instance he⁶  addressed to her a ma'amar,⁷  and it³  represents the view of Beth Shammai who maintain that a ma'amar constitutes a perfect kinyan.⁸  If so, she would be identical with the 'betrothed woman'!⁹  — And according to your view, has not a 'married woman' and 'one taken [by the levir]' the same status?¹⁰  But [the explanation must be that] 'a married woman' refers to one's own wife, and 'one taken [by the levir]' refers to that of another man.¹¹  So here also 'betrothed' means his own and 'a woman awaiting the decision of the levir', that of another.¹¹

R. Papa said: It¹²  represents the view of the following Tanna.¹³  For it was taught: It is not permissible to warn a betrothed woman in order that she may be made to drink¹⁴  while she is betrothed. She may, however, be warned in order that she may be made to drink when she is already married.¹⁵  R. Nahman b. Isaac explained: By implication.¹⁶

R. Hanina sent [an instruction] in the name of R. Johanan: A levir who addressed a ma'amar to his yebamah, while he has a living brother, causes her disqualification from the eating of terumah¹⁷  even if he is a priest and she the daughter of a priest.¹⁸  According to whom?¹⁹  If it be suggested, according to R. Meir, it is possible [it might be objected that] R. Meir said that one that is subject to an illegitimate cohabitation²⁰  is not permitted to eat terumah [only when the cohabitation is] Pentateuchally forbidden;²¹  did he, however, say [that the same law holds when the prohibition is only] Rabbinical? [Is it], however, [suggested that it was made] according to R. Eleazar and R. Simeon? [It may be objected]: If the eating of terumah is permitted to one who is subject to a cohabitation which is pentateuchally forbidden, is there any need to speak of one which is only Rabbinically forbidden! When Rabin, however, came²²  he stated: Where a levir addressed a ma'amar to his yebamah, all²³  agree that she is permitted to eat terumah. If he has a profaned brother,²⁴  all²³  agree that she is not permitted to eat.²⁵  They only differ where he²⁶  gave her²⁷  a letter of divorce:²⁸  R. Johanan maintains that she may eat, and Resh Lakish maintains that she may not eat. 'R. Johanan maintains that she may eat', for even the statement of R. Meir who holds that she may not eat applies only to one subject of a Pentateuchally forbidden cohabitation; where, however, it is only Rabbinically forbidden she may eat. 'And Resh Lakish maintains that she may not eat' for even the statement of R. Eleazar and R. Simeon, who hold that she may eat, applies only to one who has elsewhere the right²⁹  to confer the privilege of eating, but not in this case,³⁰  since he has no right³¹  to confer the privilege elsewhere. And should you suggest that here also he has the right³¹  to confer the privilege of eating in the case where she returns,³²  [it may be retorted that] one who returns³²  severs her connection with him and resumes her relationship with her father's house;³³  but this woman³⁴  remains bound to him.³⁵

IF THEY BECAME WIDOWS OR WERE DIVORCED etc. R. Hiyya b. Joseph enquired of Samuel: If a High priest betrothed a minor, who became adolescent³⁶  during her betrothal with him,³⁷

1. Supra 56a, and the woman is regarded as his wife even if the cohabitation was not intended to serve as a legal matrimonial kinyan.
2. Cf. loc. cit. and notes.
3. The Mishnah cited by R. Shesheth.
4. Who, contrary to the opinion of Samuel, maintains that the bridal chamber does constitute kinyan with ineligible women (supra 57b).
5. V. supra note 3.
6. The levir.
7. And then cohabited with her adulterously in her father-in-law's house, with no intention of effecting a legal kinyan. Alternatively: Only a ma'amar was addressed to her but no cohabitation at all took place. The cohabitation of the adulterer which, according to this interpretation, precedes that of the levir does not affect the legality of the water test since in any case the cohabitation of the first husband (the deceased brother) preceded.
8. Supra 29b. The sister-in-law thus loses entirely her former status of 'widow of a deceased brother' and assumes that of a 'betrothed woman'. Subsequent intercourse with her unless accompanied by the entry into the bridal chamber does not, therefore, change her status, as is the case where no ma'amar had been addressed, to that of a married woman. Her description, consequently, can only be that of 'one awaiting the decision of the levir'.
9. Whose case had been specifically mentioned. Why should the same law be mentioned twice?
10. And both were nevertheless specified.
11. I.e., his brother's widow whom he married.
12. The Mishnah cited by R. Shesheth.
13. It being a case where the warning was given during betrothal, and the seclusion with the man took place after marriage and cohabitation. The water test is applied on the basis of that warning. Alternatively: The warning was given during betrothal and it was followed by the seclusion with the man, the test being applied after marriage. The previously cited deduction, that when the husband is not clear from iniquity the test is not admissible, is not accepted by this authority.
14. The water of bitterness.
15. Sotah 25a. The man in such a case is clear from iniquity. No proof may consequently be adduced from the Mishnah cited by R. Shesheth that the bridal chamber constitutes kinyan. Alternatively: This Tanna does not accept the deduction in respect of the husband's clearness from iniquity. (V. supra n. 4, end).
16. [H], v. Kid. 27b. The oath the woman is made to take at the drinking of the water of bitterness in respect of the days of her betrothal is not a direct oath but one added to that which she takes in connection with a suspected act after her marriage.
17. Until marriage had been consummated.
18. Because (v. infra) his brother might cohabit with her and thus cause her prohibition to marry either of them (v. supra 50b).
19. Was R. Johanan's statement made.
20. As, e.g., in this case, where either brother might marry her, while the cohabitation of one of them is Rabbinically forbidden.
21. E.g., a widow to a High Priest.
22. From Palestine to Babylon.
23. R. Johanan as well as Resh Lakish.
24. Halal (v. Glos.) whose cohabitation would disqualify her.
25. Even though she is the daughter of a priest and even where the ma'amar had been addressed to her by a qualified priest, she is forbidden to eat terumah, owing to her being subject at least to one Pentateuchally forbidden cohabitation. Even R. Eleazar and R. Simeon who allow terumah in the case of a widow to a High priest do not allow it here since, unlike the High Priest who in cases other than that of the widow and the like is entitled to confer the right, the halal can never confer such a privilege upon anyone.
26. A levir who was a priest.
27. His yebamah who was the daughter of a priest.
28. Which Rabbinically causes her prohibition to the levir, while Pentateuchally she is still awaiting cohabitation with him. She is thus awaiting a cohabitation which is Rabbinically forbidden.
29. Through a similar act of betrothal.
30. Where a letter of divorce was given.
31. By means of a similar act of divorce.
32. To the house of her father, if she was the daughter of a priest. Cf. Lev. XXII, 13.
33. Her regaining the privilege of eating terumah is due to her relationship not with him but with her father's family.
34. To whom the letter of divorce was given.
35. Since a letter of divorce does not sever the levirate bond.
36. [H] v. infra p. 394 n. 7; perhaps of advanced age, when she is no more in possession of her full virgin powers (cf. Golds. a.l.). Such a woman is forbidden to a High priest by deduction from Lev. XXI, 13 And he shall take a wife in her virginity.
37. Lit., 'under him'.