Babylonian Talmud: Tractate Yebamoth

Folio 32a

and partially pulled down.¹  Well, let the assumption be made!²  — Had he first contracted the levirate marriage and then participated in the halizah, no objection could be raised — 3 The preventive measure, however, has been enacted against the possibility of his participating in the halizah first and contracting the levirate marriage afterwards and thus placing himself under the prohibition of That doth not build up,⁴  the All Merciful having said, 'Since he had not built⁵  he must never again build'.⁶

Raba said: If he⁷  gave a letter of divorce in respect of his ma'amar, her rival⁸  is permitted;⁹  but she herself is forbidden, because she might be mistaken for one who is the holder of a letter of divorce.¹⁰  Others say that Raba said: If he¹¹  gave a letter of divorce in respect of his ma'amar even she herself becomes permitted.¹²  What is the reason? — Because what he has done to her he has taken back.¹³

MISHNAH. IF TWO BROTHERS WERE MARRIED TO TWO SISTERS, AND ONE OF THE BROTHERS DIED, AND AFTERWARDS THE WIFE OF THE SECOND BROTHER DIED, BEHOLD, SHE¹⁴  IS FORBIDDEN TO HIM¹⁵  FOREVER, SINCE SHE WAS FORBIDDEN TO HIM FOR ONE MOMENT.¹⁶

GEMARA. Is not this obvious? If there,¹⁷  where she¹⁸  was not entirely excluded from that house¹⁹  it has been said, 'No',²⁰  how much more so here²¹  where the widow is completely excluded from that house!²²  -The Tanna had taught first this,²¹  while the other²³  was regarded by him as a permissible case,²⁴  and so he permitted it — 25 Later, however, he came to regard it as a case that was to be forbidden;²⁶  and, as it was dear to him²⁷  he placed it first; while our Mishnah was allowed to remain in its original form.²⁸

Our Rabbis learned: If he²⁹  had intercourse with her,³⁰  he is guilty on account of both 'his brother's wife'³¹  and 'his wife's sister';³²  so R. Jose. R. Simeon said: He is guilty on account of 'his brother's wife' on]y. But, surely. it was taught that R. Simeon said: He is guilty on account of 'his wife's sister' only! — This is no difficulty: There, it is a case where the surviving brother had married first³³  and the deceased had married afterwards;³⁴  here it is a case where the deceased had married first and the surviving brother afterwards.³⁵  As to R. Simeon, in the case where the deceased had married first and the surviving brother married afterwards, let her, since the prohibition of wife's sister cannot take effect, be permitted even to contract the levirate marriage! — R. Ashi replied: The prohibition of wife's sister remains suspended, and as soon as the prohibition of brother's wife is removed³⁶  the prohibition of wife's sister comes into force; hence It cannot be treated as non-existent.³⁷

Does, then, R. Jose hold the view that one prohibition may be imposed upon another? Surely, it was taught: A man who committed a transgression which involves two death penalties³⁸  is punished by the severer one. R. Jose said: He is to be dealt with In accordance with that prohibition which came into force first.³⁹  And it was taught: How is one to understand R. Jose's statement that sentence must be in accordance with the prohibition which came into force first? [If the woman was first] his mother-in-law⁴⁰  and then became also a married women, he is to be sentenced for [an offence against] his mother-in-law; if she was first a married woman and then became his mother-in-law, he is to be sentenced for [an offence against] a married woman!⁴¹

1. And the same procedure would unlawfully be followed in the case of two widows of the same brother.
2. What objection can be raised against it?
3. Lit., 'thus also', the assumption would not have mattered.
4. [H] Deut. XXV, 9.
5. I.e., refused to marry his brother's widow, but participated in her halizah.
6. Must never marry the other widow. The imperfect [H] may be rendered as a past, present or future.
7. The second brother who had addressed a ma'amar to the first brother's widow. V. our Mishnah.
8. I.e., his first wife.
9. To the third surviving brother if the second also died without issue. The two widows are no longer rivals since the divorce has annulled the ma'amar, and they. being the widows of two different brothers, are now coming from two different houses.
10. That was given to her in respect of the levirate bond as well as of the ma'amar, v. infra 52b. Such a sister-in-law is forbidden under the prohibition of That doth not build up (v. supra and notes 3, 4 and 5)' since in her case the levirate bond also had been severed.
11. V. note 6.
12. And she is thus subject to the third brother as the widow of the first.
13. The ma'amar by which he bound her he has himself annulled.
14. The widow.
15. The surviving brother.
16. Prior to his wife's death and after the death of her husband, however short that period may have been, she was forbidden to him as his wife's sister.
17. The third Mishnah, on fol. 30a supra, where there were three brothers involved, two of whom were married to two sisters and one to a stranger.
18. The widow of the first brother.
19. For though she had been forbidden to the second brother, who was married to her sister, she was permitted to the third and she remained in the family.
20. I.e., she has been forbidden to the second brother, after the death of the third brother who had married her, owing to the original prohibition which may have lasted one moment only. even after his wife (her sister) had died.
21. Our Mishnah where only two brothers are involved.
22. When her husband died there was not a single brother whom she was permitted to marry. What need, then, was there for our Mishnah?
23. v. note 1.
24. Since, there, she was not entirely forced out of the family.
25. Hence he did not consider it necessary to enunciate It 10 a Mishnah.
26. As, after all, in the case of the second brother, the levirate marriage was for a time forbidden to her.
27. Owing to its novelty and its wider range.
28. Lit. — 'did not move from its place'. Though in the presence of the other Mishnah it is indeed superfluous.
29. The levir.
30. The widow (v. our Mishnah), while his wife was still alive.
31. Since she is exempt from the levirate marriage she is forbidden to the levir as any widow of a brother who has issue.
32. So that if the offence was committed unwittingly he is liable to bring two sin.offerings.
33. One of the sisters; and thus the prohibition of 'wife's sister' came into force first.
34. The other sister. The added prohibition of 'brother's wife' could not take effect where one prohibition was already in force.
35. Cf. previous two notes mutatis mutandis.
36. [H], lit., 'to split', hence removed'.
37. Lit., 'it is not removed'. The levirate marriage is consequently forbidden.
38. Intercourse, for instance, with a mother-in.law (which is punishable by burning) who was at the time a married woman (the penalty for which Is strangulation).
39. Tosef. Sanh. XII, Sanh. 81a.
40. Having been a widow or divorcee at the time of his marriage.
41. Though the penalty in this case (strangulation) is lighter than that for an offence against a mother-in-law (burning). This proves that one prohibition may not be imposed upon another. Had it been otherwise, the severer penalty should have been inflicted though the prohibition which had caused it came into force later.

— R. Abbahu replied: R. Jose admits¹  where the latter prohibition is of a wider range.²

This is satisfactory in the case where the surviving brother had married³  first and the deceased had married⁴  afterwards, since the prohibition. having been extended in the case of the brothers, had also been extended in his own case.⁵  What extension of the prohibition is there, however, where the deceased had married³  first⁶  and the surviving brother had married⁴  afterwards?⁷  And were you to reply: Because thereby⁸  he is forbidden to marry all the sisters,⁹  [it may be retorted that] such is only a comprehensive prohibition!¹⁰

The fact is, said Raba, he is deemed¹¹  to have committed two offences,¹²  but is liable for one only.¹³

Similarly when Rabin came¹⁴  he stated in the name of R. Johanan: The offender is deemed¹¹  to have committed two offences, but he is only liable for one. What practical difference does this¹⁵  make? — That he must be buried among confirmed sinners.¹⁶

This¹⁷  is a question on which opinions differ. For It was stated: A common man¹⁸  who performed some Temple service on the Sabbath, is. R. Hiyya said, liable for two offences.' Bar Kappara said: He is only liable for one.¹⁹  R. Hiyya jumped up and took an oath. 'By the Temple',²⁰  [he exclaimed]. 'so have I heard from Rabbi:²¹  two'! Bar Kappara jumped up and took an oath, 'By the Temple. thus have I heard from Rabbi:²¹  one'! R. Hiyya began to argue the point thus: Work on the Sabbath was forbidden to all [Israelites,] and when it was permitted in the [Sanctuary], it was permitted to the priests, hence it was permitted to the priests only, but not to common men. Here, therefore, is involved the offence of Temple service by a common man, and that of the desecration of the Sabbath. Bar Kappara began to argue his point thus: Work on the Sabbath was forbidden to all [Israelites]. but when it was permitted in the Sanctuary, it was permitted [to all], hence only the offence of Temple service by a common man is here involved.

A priest having a blemish who performed [some Temple] services²²  while unclean is. R. Hiyya said, guilty of two offences. Bar Kappara said: He is guilty of one offence only. R. Hiyya jumped up and took an oath, 'By the Temple. thus have I heard from Rabbi: two'! Bar Kappara jumped up and took an oath, 'By the Temple, thus have I heard from Rabbi: one'! R. Hiyya began to reason: [Temple service during one's] uncleanness was forbidden to all; and when it was permitted in the Sanctuary,²³  it was permitted to priests who had no blemish — Hence it must have been permitted only to priests who had no blemish, but not to those who had. Consequently. both the offence of service being done by one with a blemish and that of service during one's uncleanness are here involved. Bar Kappara began to reason thus: [Temple service during] uncleanness was forbidden to all. When it was permitted at the Sanctuary.²⁴  was [universally] permitted.²⁵  Consequently. only one offence, that of service by one who had a blemish, is involved.

A common man who ate melikah²⁶  is. R. Hiyya said, guilty of two offences. Bar Kappara said: He is guilty only of one. R. Hiyya jumped up and took an oath, 'By the Temple. so I heard from Rabbi: two'! Bar Kappara jumped up and took an oath, 'By the Temple. so I heard from Rabbi: one'! R. Hiyya began to reason thus: Nebelah²⁷  was forbidden to all; and when it was permitted in the Sanctuary²⁸  it was permitted in the case of the priests. Hence it must be permitted to priests only and not to common men. Consequently. both the offence of consumption²⁹  by a common man, and that of melikah are here involved. Bar Kappara began to reason: Nebelah²⁷  was forbidden to all; and when it was permitted in the Sanctuary²⁸  it was [universally] permitted — Consequently. only the offence due to consumption²⁹  by a common man is here involved.

1. That one prohibition may be imposed upon another.
2. [H] lit., 'a prohibition which adds', i.e., one which causes an object (or a person) to be forbidden to others to whom it was not previously forbidden. Hence he admits the imposition of the prohibition of 'brother's wife' upon that of 'wife's sister', even where the latter prohibition was already in force, because the former, unlike the latter, is applicable not only to him alone but to the other brothers also. In the case, however, of a married woman who became his mother-in-law where the first prohibition was of a wider range (the woman being forbidden to all men except her husband) and the later one (forbidden to him only) of a restricted range, the second prohibition cannot be imposed upon the first. The reason why in the case of a mother-in-law who became a — married woman the sentence is to be that for an offence against a mother-in-law is not because the latter (which is of a wider range) cannot be imposed upon the former, but because wherever two penalties are to be inflicted the severer one (burning) supersedes the lighter one (strangulation).
3. One of the sisters.
4. The other sister.
5. V. supra p. 202, n. 9.
6. Bringing Into force the prohibition of brother's wife which is applicable to all brothers.
7. Adding the prohibition of wife's sister which, being applicable to himself only, is of a more restricted range, and cannot consequently be imposed on that of brother's wife, which preceded it.
8. By marrying the other sister.
9. While before this marriage the widow only was forbidden.
10. [H] lit., 'a prohibition which includes'. The additional prohibition includes the widow in the same manner only as it does the other sisters but, unlike an issur mosif (the prohibition of the wider range, v. supra p. 202, n. 9), it does not place any additional restriction as far as the widow herself is concerned upon any other men.
11. Lit., 'I bring upon him'.
12. I.e., in this sense only is R. Jose's statement, that he is guilty of two offences (supra 32a), to be understood.
13. Because R. Jose. in fact, does not admit the imposition of one prohibition upon another.
14. From Palestine to Babylon.
15. The fact that he is theoretically guilty of two offences.
16. The Beth din had at its disposal two burial places, and offenders who were executed or died were buried in the one or the other according to the degree of their respective offences. (V. Sanh. 46a). The reference here will consequently be to an intentional transgression.
17. Whether one act involving two transgressions is deemed to be one offence or two offences.
18. [H] lit., 'a stranger', I.e., a non-priest.
19. This is explained infra.
20. Lit., 'the (Temple) service'.
21. R. Judah the Prince, compiler of the Mishnah.
22. Such as that connected with the rites of a congregational offering which may be performed in certain circumstances by priests (v. Yoma 6b). even when they are unclean, provided they are physically fit.
23. Cf. previous note.
24. v. p. 204, n' 7.
25. Even to a priest afflicted with a blemish.
26. [H] (rt. [H] 'to pinch'), applied to the meat, of a fowl whose head was 'pinched off', in accordance with Lev. I, 15.
27. [H] 'a corpse'. 'carrion', applied also to animals that have not been ritually slaughtered and the consumption of which is forbidden.
28. Melikah being permitted to the priests.
29. Of sacrificial meat.