Babylonian Talmud: Tractate Yebamoth

Folio 14a

R. Johanan, however, said: They certainly acted [in accordance with their views]. Herein they¹  differ on the same point as do Rab and Samuel. For Rab maintains that Beth Shammai did not act in accordance with their views, while Samuel maintains that they certainly did act [in accordance with their views]. When?²  If it be suggested, prior to the decision of the heavenly voice,³  then what reason has he who maintains that they did not act [in accordance with their own view]? If, however, after the decision of the heavenly voice, what reason has he who maintains that they did act [in accordance with their views]? — If you wish I could say, prior to the decision of the heavenly voice; and if you prefer I could say, after the heavenly voice. 'If you wish I could say, prior to the heavenly voice', when, for instance, Beth Hillel were in the majority: One maintains⁴  that they⁵  did not act [according to their view] for the obvious reason that Beth Hillel were in the majority; while the other maintains⁶  that they did act [according to their view, because] a majority is to be followed only where both sides are equally matched;⁷  in this case, however, Beth Shammai were keener of intellect. 'And if you prefer I could say, after the heavenly voice'; one maintains that they⁵  did not act [according to their view] for the obvious reason that the heavenly voice had already gone forth;⁸  while the other who maintains that they did act [according to their view] is [of the same opinion as] R. Joshua who declared that no regard need be paid to a heavenly voice.⁹

Now as to the other who 'maintains that they did act [according to their views]'¹⁰  — should not the warning, 'Lo tithgodedu, you shall not form separate sects'¹¹  be applied? — Abaye replied: The warning against opposing sects is only applicable to such a case as that of two courts of law in the same town, one of whom rules in accordance with the views of Beth Shammai while the other rules in accordance with the views of Beth Hillel. In the case, however, of two courts of law in two different towns [the difference in practice] does not matter. Said Raba to him: Surely the case of Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel is like that of two courts of law in the same town! The fact, however, is, said Raba, that the warning against opposing sects is only applicable to such a case as that of one court of law in the same town, half of which rule in accordance with the views of Beth Shammai while the other half rule in accordance with the views of Beth Hillel. In the case, however, of two courts of law in the same town [the difference in practice] does not matter.

Come and hear: In the place of R. Eliezer, wood was cut on the Sabbath wherewith to produce charcoal on which to forge the iron.¹²  In the place of R. Jose the Galilean the flesh of fowl was eaten with milk.¹³  In the place of R. Eliezer only¹⁴  but not in the place of R. Akiba; for we learnt: R. Akiba laid it down as a general rule that any labour which may be performed on the Sabbath Eve¹⁵  does not supersede the Sabbath!¹⁶  — What an objection is this! The case, surely, is different [when the varied practices are respectively confined to] different localities. What then did he who raised this question imagine?¹⁷  — It might have been assumed that owing to the great restrictions of the Sabbath [different localities are regarded] as one place, hence it was necessary to teach us [that the law was not so].

Come and hear: R. Abbahu, whenever he happened to be in the place of R. Joshua b. Levi, carried¹⁸  a candle,¹⁹  but when he happened to be in the place of R. Johanan²⁰  he did not carry a candle!²¹  — What question is this! Has it not been said that the case is different [when the varied practices are respectively confined to] varied localities? — This is the question:²²  How could R. Abbahu act in one place in one way and in another place in another way?²³  — R. Abbahu is of the same opinion as R. Joshua b. Levi,²⁴  but when he happened to be in R. Johanan's place he did not move a candle out of respect for R. Johanan. But his attendant,²⁵  surely was also there!²⁶  — He gave his attendant the necessary instructions.

Come and hear: THOUGH THESE FORBADE WHAT THE OTHERS PERMITTED … BETH SHAMMAI, NEVERTHELESS, DID NOT REFRAIN FROM MARRYING WOMEN FROM THE FAMILIES OF BETH HILLEL, NOR DID BETH HILLEL [REFRAIN FROM MARRYING WOMEN] FROM THE FAMILIES OF BETH SHAMMAI. Now, if it be said that they²⁷  did not act [in accordance with their own view] one can well understand why THEY DID NOT REFRAIN [from intermarrying with one another].²⁸  If, however, it be said that they²⁷  did act [in accordance with their own view], why did they not refrain? That Beth Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from the families of Beth Hillel may well be justified because such²⁹  are the children of persons guilty only of the infringement of a negative precept;³⁰  but why did not Beth Hillel refrain from [marrying women from the families of] Beth Shammai? Such,³¹  surely, being children of persons who are guilty of an offence involving kareth, are bastards!³²  And if it be suggested that Beth Hillel are of the opinion that the descendant of those who are guilty of an offence involving kareth is not a bastard,³³  surely, [it may be retorted], R. Eleazar said: Although Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel are in disagreement on the questions of rivals, they concede that a bastard is only he who is descended from a marriage which is forbidden as incest and punishable with kareth! Does not this then conclusively prove that they²⁷  did not act [in accordance with their own view]? — No; they²⁷  acted, indeed, [in accordance with their own view], but they²⁷  informed them³⁴  [of the existence of any such cases] and they³⁴  kept away.

This³⁵  may also be proved by logical inference; for in the final clause it was stated. [SIMILARLY IN RESPECT OF] ALL [THE QUESTIONS OF RITUAL] CLEANNESS AND UNCLEANNESS, WHICH THESE DECLARED CLEAN WHERE THE OTHERS DECLARED UNCLEAN, NEITHER OF THEM ABSTAINED FROM USING THE UTENSILS OF THE OTHERS FOR THE PREPARATION OF FOOD THAT WAS RITUALLY CLEAN.

1. R. Johanan and R. Lakish.
2. I.e., to what period does the dispute just mentioned refer?
3. [H] (v. Glos. s.v. Bath Kol), which decided that the law in practice was always to be in accordance with the rulings of Beth Hillel (v. 'Er. 13a).
4. Lit., 'according to him who said'.
5. Beth Shammai.
6. Lit., 'and he who said'.
7. In qualifications and attainments.
8. And decided the issue in favour of Beth Hillel.
9. B.M. 59b, Ber. 52a, 'Er. 7a, Pes. 114a.
10. Even after the heavenly voice.
11. Cf. supra p. 70, n. 13.
12. The knife required for the performance of circumcision. The circumcision of a child, his health permitting, must take place on the eighth day of his birth (v. Gen. XVII, 12) even though it happened to fall on a Sabbath when manual labour is prohibited. And since the precept itself supersedes the Sabbath, all its requisites such as the wood and coals (for the preparation of warm water) and the knife may also be performed on the Sabbath.
13. Though it is forbidden to eat meat, or any dishes made of meat, together with milk or any preparation of milk. R. Jose exempts the flesh of fowl from the general prohibition of the consumption of meat and milk. Shab. 130a, Hul. 116a.
14. Lit., 'yes'; only there was the preparation of the requisites of circumcision permitted on the Sabbath.
15. Such as the cutting of wood, the production of coals and the forging of the knife.
16. Now, in view of the undesirability of creating different sects, why were all these varied practices allowed?
17. It should have been obvious to him that different localities may differ in their custom. (Cf. supra p. 53, n. 11.)
18. Lit., 'moved'.
19. On the Sabbath. A candle, though it was burning when Sabbath set in may, according to R. Joshua who follows R. Simeon in permitting mukzeh (v. next note), be moved on the Sabbath after the flame has gone out.
20. R. Johanan, following R. Judah, forbids the carrying or moving of a candle that had been burning when the Sabbath set in though it had subsequently gone out. As it was burning at the commencement of the Sabbath it was at that time fit for no other use and is regarded, therefore, as mukzeh, i.e., 'something set aside', that is not to be used for any other purpose. Anything that was mukzeh when the Sabbath began remains so until it ends.
21. Is not the practice of carrying a candle in one place and not carrying it in another as undesirable as the formation of opposing sects?
22. Lit., 'we say thus'.
23. Lit., 'how did he do here thus' (bis).
24. V. supra note 3.
25. Who well knew that his master was of the same opinion as R. Joshua b. Levi. The [H] was in many cases both an attendant on the master and also one of his learned disciples.
26. And might move such a candle on the Sabbath even in R. Johanan's place.
27. Beth Shammai.
28. Since, in practice, both schools followed the same principles.
29. The descendants from the marriages with strangers contracted by the rivals who, in accordance with the ruling of Beth Hillel, performed no halizah.
30. Even Beth Shammai who require the rivals to perform the halizah regard such marriages as the infringement of a prohibition only ('The wife of the dead shall not be married abroad', Deut. XXV, 5), which does not involve kareth. The children of such marriages are consequently not deemed to be bastards.
31. Descendants from marriages between rivals and brothers-in-law. Such marriages, which are permitted by Beth Shammai, are regarded by Beth Hillel as forbidden under the prohibition of marrying one's brother's wife, which involves the penalty of kareth.
32. How, then, did they intermarry with families containing such members?
33. A bastard being the descendant only of such marriages as are subject to one of the capital punishments that are carried out under the jurisdiction of a court.
34. Beth Hillel.
35. That Beth Shammai duly informed Beth Hillel of any families contracting marriages which according to the ruling of the latter were forbidden.

Now, if it be agreed that the required information was supplied¹  one well understands why they²  did not abstain.³  If, however, it be assumed that no such information was supplied, one can still understand why Beth Shammai did not abstain from using the utensils of Beth Hillel, since that which was regarded by Beth Hillel as ritually unclean was deemed by Beth Shammai to be ritually clean; but why did not Beth Hillel abstain from using the utensils of Beth Shammai when that which was deemed clean by Beth Shammai was regarded as unclean by Beth Hillel? Must it not, then, be concluded that they supplied them with the required information! Our point is thus proved.

In what respect is the one⁴  more conclusive proof⁵  than the other?⁶  — It might have been thought that the case of a rival⁷  receives due publicity,⁸  hence it was necessary [for the inference from the final clause] to be cited.

[Reverting to] the previous text, 'R. Eleazar said: Although Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel are in disagreement on the question of rivals they concede that a bastard is only he who is descended from a marriage forbidden as incest and punishable by kareth'. Who concedes? If it be said, Beth Shammai to Beth Hillel;⁹  this, surely, is obvious, since the children of those who are guilty of the infringement of a negative precept¹⁰  are deemed legitimate.¹¹  Must it not consequently be the case that Beth Hillel conceded to Beth Shammai;¹²  but this very case is subject to the penalty of kareth! — The fact is that Beth Shammai conceded to Beth Hillel; and the purpose was to exclude the opinion of R. Akiba, who maintains that a descendant from persons guilty of the infringement of a negative precept is deemed a bastard.¹³  Hence it was taught¹⁴  that a descendant from persons guilty of the infringement of a negative precept is not deemed a bastard.

Come and hear: Although Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel are in disagreement on the questions of rivals, sisters,¹⁵  an old bill of divorce,¹⁶  a doubtfully married woman,¹⁷  a woman whom her husband had divorced¹⁸  and who stayed with him over the night in an inn,¹⁹  money, valuables, a perutah and the value of a perutah,²⁰  Beth Shammai did not, nevertheless, abstain from marrying women of the families of Beth Hillel, nor did Beth Hillel refrain from marrying those of Beth Shammai. This is to teach you that they shewed love and friendship towards one another, thus putting into practice the Scriptural text, Love ye truth and peace.²¹  R. Simeon said: They abstained [from marrying] in cases of certainty but did not abstain in doubtful cases.²²  Now, if you agree that they²³  acted [in accordance with their own views] one can well understand why they abstained. If, however, you assume that they did not so act, why did they abstain? — And how do you understand this? Even if it be granted that they did act (in accordance with their own views], one can only understand why Beth Hillel abstained from intermarrying with Beth Shammai, because the latter, in the opinion of Beth Hillel, were guilty of offences involving kareth and their descendants were consequently bastards; as to Beth Shammai, however, why did they abstain from intermarrying with Beth Hillel, when they were [even in the opinion of Beth Shammai] only guilty of the infringement of a negative precept and [their descendants] were consequently legitimate? — As R. Nahman said elsewhere that the statement was required only for the case of the rival herself, so here also the Statement is required for the case of the rival herself.²⁴

Why is a doubtful case different from a case of a certainty? Obviously because it is forbidden. Is not a doubtful case also forbidden? — Do not read, 'from a doubtful case', but 'from a case unknown', since when they received the information they kept away.²⁵  And what does he teach us thereby? That they shewed love and friendship to one another? But this is exactly the same as the first clause!²⁶  — He teaches us this: That the entire Mishnah represents the views of R. Simeon.

Come and hear: R. Johanan b. Nuri said: 'How is this law²⁷  to be promulgated in Israel? Were we to act in accordance with the ruling of Beth Shammai,²⁸  the child would, in accordance with the ruling of Beth Hillel, be a bastard.²⁹  And were we to act in accordance with the ruling of Beth Hillel,³⁰  the child, according to the ruling of Beth Shammai, would be tainted;³¹  come, then, and let us issue an ordinance that the rivals

1. By Beth Shammai.
2. Beth Hillel, who were the more rigorous in matters of ritual cleanness.
3. From using the utensils of Beth Shammai. The fact that any vessel was not clean according to Beth Hillel would have been, they knew, duly communicated to them.
4. The inference from the final clause of our Mishnah relating to ritual cleanness and uncleanness.
5. That the required information was supplied.
6. The first clause dealing with the marriages of rivals.
7. Who married one of the brothers.
8. And no special report on such a case is needed.
9. Where a rival married a stranger without previously performing the halizah (v. our Mishnah).
10. V. supra p. 75, n. 4.
11. And the question of legitimacy does not at all arise in the dispute.
12. In respect of a rival who married one of the brothers.
13. Infra 49a.
14. In our Mishnah.
15. Who married their brothers; infra 26a.
16. Git. 79b.
17. I.e., where the validity of her marriage is in doubt. V. infra 107a.
18. Lit., 'and about him who divorced his wife'.
19. Git. 81a.
20. The last four deal with the question of what constitutes legal betrothal. Kid. 2a and 11a.
21. Zech. VIII, 19.
22. Tosef. Yeb. I.
23. Beth Shammai.
24. Whom Beth Shammai abstained from marrying before she performed the halizah.
25. So long, therefore, as no report had been received the unknown case was assumed to belong to the pure families.
26. Why then should there be a repetition of the same thing?
27. Relating to the marriages of rivals.
28. Who permit the rivals to marry the brothers.
29. Having been born from a forbidden marriage (that of a brother's wife) which involves kareth.
30. Permitting rivals to marry strangers without previous halizah.
31. Though not actually a bastard, he would, were he a kohen, be disqualified from the priesthood.