Previous Folio / Yebamoth Directory / Tractate List / Navigate Site

Babylonian Talmud: Tractate Yebamoth

Folio 108a

people might mistake it for a letter of divorce,1  the following formula was instituted: 'On the Nth day, So-and-so the daughter of So-and-so made a declaration of refusal in our presence'.

Our Rabbis taught: What is regarded as mi'un? — If she2  said, 'I do not want So-and-so my husband', or 'I do not want the betrothal which my mother or my brothers have arranged for me'.3  R. Judah said even more than this:4  Even if while sitting in the bridal litter,5  and being carried6  from her father's house to the home of her husband, she said, 'I do not want So-and-so my husband', her statement7  is regarded as8  a declaration of refusal. R. Judah said more than this:9  Even if, while the wedding guests were reclining [on their dining couches] in her husband's house and she was standing and waiting10  upon them, she said to them, 'I do not want my husband So-and-so', her statement11  is regarded as12  a declaration of refusal. R. Jose b. Judah said more than this: Even if, while her husband sent her to a shopkeeper to bring him something for himself,13  she said, 'I do not want So-and-so my husband', you can have no mi'un more valid than this one.14

R. HANINA B. ANTIGONUS RULED: ANY CHILD etc. Rab Judah reported in the name of Samuel: The halachah is in agreement with R. Hanina b. Antigonus.

A Tanna taught: If a minor who did not make a declaration of refusal married herself again, her marriage, it was stated in the name of R. Judah b. Bathyra, is to be regarded as her declaration of refusal.

It was asked: What is the law where she15  was only betrothed?16  — Come and hear: If a minor who did not make a declaration of refusal betrothed herself [to another man], her betrothal, it was stated in the name of R. Judah b. Bathyra, is regarded as her declaration of refusal.

The question was raised: Do the Rabbis differ from R. Judah b. Bathyra or not? If you can find some ground for holding that they differ, [it may be asked whether only] in respect of betrothal,17  or even in respect of marriage? And should you find some reason for holding that they differ even in respect of marriage [the question arises whether] the halachah is in agreement with him18  or not? And if you can find some ground for holding that the halachah is in agreement with him [it may be asked whether only] in respect of marriage or also in respect of betrothal? — Come and hear: Rab Judah stated in the name of Samuel that the halachah is in agreement with R. Judah b. Bathyra;19  [since it had to be stated that] the halachah [is so] it may be inferred that they differ.20

The question, however, still remains [whether the minor spoken of]21  is one who was married in the first instance22  or perhaps she is one who was only betrothed?23  — Come and hear: Abdan's24  daughters-in-law25  rebelled [against their husbands].26  When Rabbi sent a pair of Rabbis to interrogate then,27  some women said to them, 'See your husbands are coming'. 'May they', they replied, 'be your husbands!'28  and 'Rabbi decided: 'No more significant mi'un than this is required'. Was not this a case of marriage?29  — No, one of betrothal only. The halachah, however, is in agreement with R. Judah b. Bathyra, even where marriage with the first husband has taken place.

R. ELIEZER30  RULED etc. Rab Judah stated in the name of Samuel: I have surveyed [the rulings] of the Sages from all aspects and found no man who was so consistent in his treatment of the minor as R. Eliezer.30  For R. Eliezer30  regarded her as one taking a walk with [her husband] in his courtyard who, when she rises from his bosom, performs her ritual immersion31  and is permitted to eat terumah in the evening.32

It was taught: R. Eliezer stated: There is no validity whatsoever in the act of a minor, and her husband is entitled neither to anything she may find,33  nor to the work of her hands,33  nor may he annul her vows;34  he is not her heir33  and he may not defile himself for her.35  This is the general rule: She is in no respect regarded as his wife, except that it is necessary for her to make a declaration of refusal.36  R. Joshua stated: Her husband has the right to anything she finds37  and to the work of her hands,37  to annul her vows,34  to be her heir,37  and to defile himself for her;38  the general principle being that she is regarded as his wife in every respect, except that she may leave him36  by a declaration of refusal.39  Said Rabbi: The views of R. Eliezer are more acceptable than those of R. Joshua; for R. Eliezer is consistent throughout in his treatment of the minor while R. Joshua makes distinctions. What [unreasonable] distinctions does he make? — If she is regarded as his wife, she should also require a letter of divorce.40  But according to R. Eliezer also [it may be argued] if she is not regarded as his wife, she should require no mi'un either! — Should she then depart without any formality whatever?41

R. ELIEZER B. JACOB RULED: etc. What is to be understood by a HINDRANCE THAT WAS DUE TO THE HUSBAND and a HINDRANCE THAT WAS NOT DUE TO THE HUSBAND? — Rab Judah replied in the name of Samuel: If when she was asked to marry42  she replied, '[I must refuse the offer] owing to So-and-so my husband'; such a HINDRANCE is one THAT WAS DUE TO THE HUSBAND.43  [If, however, she refused the offer] 'because', [she said] 'the men [who proposed] are not suitable for me'; such a HINDRANCE is one THAT WAS NOT DUE TO THE HUSBAND.

Both Abaye b. Abin and R. Hanina b. Abin gave the following explanation: If he gave her a letter of divorce, the HINDRANCE IS one THAT WAS DUE TO THE HUSBAND44  and, therefore, he is forbidden to marry her relatives and she is forbidden to marry his relatives, and he also disqualifies her from marrying a priest.45  If, however, she exercised her right of refusal against him, the HINDRANCE is one THAT WAS NOT DUE TO THE HUSBAND and, therefore, he is permitted to marry her relatives and she is permitted to marry his relatives, and he does not disqualify her from marrying a priest.46

But surely, this47  was specifically stated below: If a minor made a declaration of refusal against a man, he is permitted to marry her relatives and she is permitted to marry his relatives, and he does not disqualify her from marrying a priest; but if he gave her a letter of divorce he is forbidden to marry her relatives and she is forbidden to marry his relatives, and he also disqualifies her from marrying a priest!48  — The latter49  is merely an explanation [of the former].50

MISHNAH. IF A MINOR MADE A DECLARATION OF REFUSAL AGAINST A MAN, HE IS PERMITTED [TO MARRY] HER RELATIVES AND SHE IS PERMITTED TO [MARRY] HIS RELATIVES, AND HE DOES NOT DISQUALIFY HER FROM [MARRYING] A PRIEST;51  BUT IF HE GAVE HER A LETTER OF DIVORCE, HE IS FORBIDDEN TO [MARRY] HER RELATIVES AND SHE IS FORBIDDEN TO [MARRY] HIS RELATIVES, AND HE ALSO DISQUALIFIES HER FROM [MARRYING] A PRIEST.52  IF HE GAVE HER A LETTER OF DIVORCE AND REMARRIED HER AND, AFTER SHE HAD EXERCISED HER RIGHT OF REFUSAL AGAINST HIM, SHE WAS MARRIED TO ANOTHER MAN AND BECAME A WIDOW OR WAS DIVORCED, SHE IS PERMITTED TO RETURN TO HIM.53  IF, HOWEVER, SHE EXERCISED HER RIGHT OF REFUSAL AGAINST HIM54  AND HE REMARRIED HER, AND SUBSEQUENTLY GAVE HER A LETTER OF DIVORCE AND THEN SHE WAS MARRIED TO ANOTHER MAN AND BECAME A WIDOW OR WAS DIVORCED, SHE IS FORBIDDEN TO RETURN TO HIM.55


Original footnotes renumbered. See Structure of the Talmud Files
  1. And might consequently include the formula in letters of divorce also.
  2. The minor.
  3. Lit., 'with which they have consecrated me'.
  4. I.e., extended the scope of mi'un still further.
  5. [H], [G].
  6. Lit., 'and goes
  7. Though it might be objected that, had she really meant what she said, she would have refused to be carried to her husband.
  8. Lit., 'it is'.
  9. V. supra note 3.
  10. Lit., 'and giving drink'.
  11. Though her waiting upon the guests might seem to contradict her declaration, and though no proper Beth din is present.
  12. Lit., 'behold it'.
  13. Lit., 'an object of his'.
  14. Tosef. Yeb. XIII. Though her statement might possibly be the result of a mere outburst against her husband for troubling her with his errand, and though no one but the shopkeeper was present when she made the statement.
  15. A minor who did not make her declaration of refusal.
  16. Not married. Has betrothal the same validity as marriage?
  17. Do they require separate mi'un, but not in the case of marriage, where they agree with R. Judah.
  18. R. Judah; though he is in the minority.
  19. In respect of marriage as well as in that of betrothal.
  20. Had they all been of the same opinion there would have been no need to make the statement that the halachah agrees with him.
  21. Concerning whom it was ruled that no mi'un is required.
  22. l.e., to her first husband.
  23. But if married, specific mi'un is required.
  24. Abdan was one of Rabbi's disciples, who, after an incident with R. Ishmael, lost his two sons the husbands of the young women here mentioned. Cf. supra 105b.
  25. Who were minors.
  26. Refusing to perform their marital obligations.
  27. To ascertain whether their refusal was in earnest.
  28. I.e., you are welcome to them.
  29. Lit., 'what not (but) that she was married', i.e., each of them was married to her husband, and, since a mere casual remark was nevertheless accepted by Rabbi as mi'un, it may be inferred that an actual marriage with, or a betrothal to another man may even more so be regarded as mi'un.
  30. Cf. supra p. 746, n. 4.
  31. Necessitated by their connubial intercourse.
  32. If her father is a priest, though her husband is an Israelite. R. Eliezer does not regard the minor as a wife either in respect of the requirement of mi'un or in respect of any other restrictions or privileges such as those relating to terumah.
  33. To which a lawful husband is entitled.
  34. Which is the privilege of a husband. Cf. Num. XXX. 71f.
  35. If he is a priest. Only a lawful husband may. Cf. Lev. XXI, 2.
  36. If she wishes to marry another man.
  37. Rabbinic law has conferred upon him the same rights as those of a lawful husband. Cf. supra n. 4.
  38. Even if he is a priest (cf. supra n. 6). She is regarded as a meth mizwah (v. Glos.), hence he may defile himself for her though Pentateuchally she is not his proper wife.
  39. And no letter of divorce is required.
  40. Mi'un should not have been allowed.
  41. Certainly not. Hence the requirement of mi'un.
  42. While she was still living with her first husband.
  43. Since the minor has shewn by her declaration that it was her desire to continue to live with him.
  44. Since she did not exercise her right of refusal it is obvious that as far as she was concerned the union would never have been broken.
  45. Like any other divorced woman.
  46. Since she is not regarded as his wife.
  47. Our Mishnah according to the explanation of Abaye and R. Hanina.
  48. V. Mishnah intro. Why then should the same ruling be recorded twice?
  49. The Mishnah cited.
  50. R. Eliezer b. Jacob's ruling in our Mishnah.
  51. Since she is not regarded as his wife.
  52. Like any other divorced woman.
  53. It is only a divorced woman that must not be remarried by her first husband after she had been married to another (v. Deut. XXIV, 2-4) but not a minor who left her husband by mi'un which even cancels her status of divorcee in which she may find herself after a previous separation from her husband.
  54. Her first husband.
  55. Since her second separation from her first husband was by means of a letter of divorce, she retains the status of a divorcee. Cf. supra n. 6.

Yebamoth 108b

THIS IS THE GENERAL RULE: IF DIVORCE FOLLOWED MI'UN1  SHE IS FORBIDDEN TO RETURN TO HIM,2  AND IF MI'UN FOLLOWED DIVORCE1  SHE IS PERMITTED TO RETURN TO HIM.3

IF A MINOR EXERCISED HER RIGHT OF REFUSAL AGAINST A MAN, AND THEN SHE WAS MARRIED TO ANOTHER MAN WHO DIVORCED HER, AND AFTERWARDS TO ANOTHER MAN AGAINST WHOM SHE MADE A DECLARATION OF REFUSAL, AND THEN TO ANOTHER MAN WHO DIVORCED HER,4  SHE5  IS FORBIDDEN TO RETURN TO THE MAN FROM WHOM SHE WAS SEPARATED BY A LETTER OF DIVORCE, BUT IS PERMITTED TO RETURN TO HIM FROM WHOM SHE WAS SEPARATED BY HER EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT OF MI'UN.

GEMARA. It is thus6  evident that mi'un has the power to cancel7  divorce; but this, surely, is contradicted by the following: IF A MINOR EXERCISED THE RIGHT OF REFUSAL AGAINST A MAN AND THEN WAS MARRIED TO ANOTHER MAN WHO DIVORCED HER, AND AFTERWARDS TO ANOTHER MAN AGAINST WHOM SHE MADE A DECLARATION OF REFUSAL, AND THEN TO ANOTHER MAN WHO DIVORCED HER,8  SHE5  IS FORBIDDEN TO RETURN TO THE MAN FROM WHOM SHE WAS SEPARATED BY A LETTER OF DIVORCE, BUT IS PERMITTED TO RETURN TO HIM FROM WHOM SHE WAS SEPARATED BY HER EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT OF MI'UN, from which it is evident that mi'un against his fellow has no power to cancel7  his own divorce!9  — Rab Judah replied in the name of Samuel: There is a break10  [in our Mishnah], the one who taught the former11  did not teach the latter.11  Raba12  said: But what contradiction is this? It is possible that mi'un13  cancels his own divorce, but that the mi'un against his fellow14  does not cancel his own letter of divorce! But in what way is the mi'un against his fellow different from one against himself] that it should not cancel his own15  divorce? [Obviously for the reason that] as she is familiar with his15  hints and gesticulations he15  might allure her and marry her again.16  [But if this is the case] mi'un against himself also should not cancel his divorce, [for the same reason] that as she is familiar with his hints and gesticulations he might allure her and marry her again! Surely, he15  had already tried to allure17  her but she did not succumb.18

If a contradiction, however, [exists it is that between one ruling] concerning his fellow against [another ruling] concerning his fellow: IF, HOWEVER, SHE EXERCISED HER RIGHT OF REFUSAL AGAINST HIM AND HE REMARRIED HER, AND HAVING SUBSEQUENTLY GIVEN HER A LETTER OF DIVORCE SHE MARRIED ANOTHER MAN AND BECAME A WIDOW OR WAS DIVORCED, SHE IS FORBIDDEN TO RETURN TO HIM. The reason [then why she is forbidden to return to him is] because she BECAME A WIDOW OR WAS DIVORCED, but had she exercised her right of refusal19  she would have been permitted to return to him,20  from which it is evident that the mi'un against his fellow has the power to cancel21  his own divorce; but this view is contradictory to the following: IF A MINOR EXERCISED THE RIGHT OF REFUSAL AGAINST HER HUSBAND AND THEN WAS MARRIED TO ANOTHER MAN WHO DIVORCED HER, AND AFTERWARDS TO AN OTHER MAN AGAINST WHOM SHE MADE A DECLARATION OF REFUSAL, SHE22  IS FORBIDDEN TO RETURN TO THE MAN FROM WHOM SHE WAS SEPARATED BY A LETTER OF DIVORCE, BUT IS PERMITTED TO RETURN TO HIM FROM WHOM SHE WAS SEPARATED BY HER EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT OF MI'UN. From this, then, it is evident that the mi'un against his fellow has no power to cancel23  his own divorce! R. Eleazar replied: There is a break24  [in our Mishnah]; the one who taught the former25  did not teach the latter.25  'Ulla replied: [The latter statement refers to a case where], for instance, she was thrice divorced, so that she appears like a grown up.26

Who taught [the two respective statements of our Mishnah]?27  Rab Judah replied in the name of Rab: To this may be applied the Scriptural text,28  We have drunk our water for money; our wood cometh to us for price.29  In the time of proscription30  the following halachah was inquired for: If a minor left her first husband with a letter of divorce and her second husband through mi'un, may she return to her first husband? They hired a man for four hundred zuz,31  and [through him] they addressed the enquiry to R. Akiba in prison,32  and he stated that she was forbidden.33  R. Judah b. Bathyra [also was asked] at Nesibis and he too forbade her.33  Said R. Ishmael son of R. Jose: There was no need for us to [ascertain] such [an halachah],34  For if in a prohibition involving the penalty of kareth35  he has been permitted36  how much more so37  in one [involving only the penalty of] a negative commandment.38  But the enquiry was in this manner: If [a minor] was the wife of his mother's brother, and consequently forbidden to him as a relative of the second degree,39  and his paternal brother [subsequently] married her40  and died,41  may she now exercise her right of mi'un,42  and thus annul her first marriage43  and so be permitted to contract the levirate marriage?44  Is45  mi'un valid after [a husband's] death where a religious performance46  is involved, or not? Two men were hired for four hundred zuz47  and when they came and asked R. Akiba in prison he ruled [that such levirate marriage was] forbidden; and when R. Judah b. Bathyra [was asked] at Nesibis he also decided that it was forbidden.

R. Isaac b. Ashian stated: Rab, however, admits that she48  is permitted to marry the brother49  of the man whom she is forbidden [to remarry].50  Is not this obvious? For it is only he with whose hints and gesticulations she is familiar but not his brother!51  — It might have been assumed that [marriage with] the one52  should be forbidden as a preventive measure against the other52  hence we were taught [that his brother may marry her]. Another reading: R. Isaac b. Ashian stated: As she53  is forbidden to him54  so is she forbidden to his brothers. But, surely, she is not familiar with their hints and gesticulations!55  — His brothers were forbidden [marriage with her] as a preventive measure against [marriage] with him.


Original footnotes renumbered. See Structure of the Talmud Files
  1. Irrespective of the number of times the man married and divorced her and the number of times she exercised the right of mi'un.
  2. Because her last separation was by means of a letter of divorce. Cf. supra. n. 8.
  3. Cf. supra n. 6.
  4. Others insert here, 'to another against whom she exercised her right of refusal' (cf. separate edd. of the Mishnah, Alfasi and BaH).
  5. Cur. edd., 'this is the general rule' is here omitted in accordance with the reading of the separate edd. of the Mishnah and Alfasi.
  6. Since it was ruled that IF MI'UN FOLLOWED DIVORCE SHE IS PERMITTED TO RETURN to her husband, despite the divorce that preceded it. Cf. supra p. 751, 15, 6.
  7. Lit., 'comes … and cancels'.
  8. V. supra note 1.
  9. That preceded the mi'un.
  10. [H] (rt. [H], 'to break'). Others 'contradiction' (cf. Rashi, Levy and Jast ).
  11. Lit., 'this'.
  12. Others, 'Rabbah'. Cf. BaH.
  13. The case spoken of in the first statement of our Mishnah.
  14. Spoken of in the second statement.
  15. The first husband.
  16. Lit., 'entangle and bring her', i.e., he might take advantage of their earlier familiarity and insidiously ingratiate himself with her, creating dislike between her and her second husband so that she might be led to exercise her right of mi'un against the latter and return to him.
  17. Cf. supra n. 3.
  18. Lit., 'she was not entangled', 'confused'. The fact that she exercised the right of refusal against him after he had married her a second time and presumably made every effort to retain her, may be regarded as proof that she would not be induced to marry him a third time. When the mi'un, however, concerns a second husband. It is quite likely that, as her separation from her first husband was not due to her mi'un but to his divorcing her, she might readily consent to return to him and thus allow him to induce her to exercise her right of mi'un against her second husband.
  19. Against her second husband.
  20. Her first husband.
  21. Lit., 'comes … and cancels'.
  22. V. supra p. 752, n. 2.
  23. Lit., 'comes and cancels'.
  24. V. supra p. 752, n. 7.
  25. Lit., 'this'.
  26. It is in such a case only that she may not he remarried to any of the men, even though her separation from her last husband was by mi'un. If, however, she was divorced once or twice only, the mi'un against her last husband confirms her in the state of her minority, and she may be married again by either of the men who had previously divorced her.
  27. Concerning which it was said supra that they represent the views of different authors.
  28. Lit., 'what (is the meaning) of that which was written'.
  29. Lam. v, 4.
  30. Lit., 'danger': the times of the suppression of the Bar Kokeba revolt in 135 C.E. when the study of the Torah and Rabbinic or oral law was forbidden by the Roman authorities under pain of death,
  31. V. Glos.
  32. The payment of the exorbitant sum of four hundred zuz for obtaining the required ruling recalled to Rab's mind the text of Lamentations quoted.
  33. To return to her first husband.
  34. Since, as is shewn presently, it is obvious that the minor is permitted to marry her first husband again after she has been separated from her second husband by mi'un.
  35. Marriage with a married woman.
  36. In the case of a minor who has exercised the right of mi'un.
  37. Should one be permitted to marry her.
  38. That of again marrying one's divorced wife. Thus it has been shewn that the author of the first statement in our Mishnah was Rab and that the author of the second statement was R. Ishmael son of R. Jose. Rab, though he belonged to the first generation of Amoraim, was also among the last of the Tannaim. Hence he was sometimes described as Tanna.
  39. Forbidden by Rabbinic law. Cf. supra 21a.
  40. After the death of her first husband.
  41. Without issue, so that she became subject to levirate marriage with his paternal brother.
  42. Against her first husband, through marriage with whom she became forbidden to the levir, the man in question.
  43. And remove thereby her forbidden relationship with the levir.
  44. With the levir between whom and herself no forbidden relationship any longer exists owing to her mi'un. Cf. supra notes 7 and 8.
  45. Cur. edd. insert in parenthesis 'her rival'.
  46. That of the levirate marriage (Deut. XXV, 5).
  47. V. Glos.
  48. A divorced minor who may not be married again by the husband who divorced her though she was separated from her second husband by mi'un.
  49. She is not regarded as his brother's divorcee.
  50. Though her mi'un does not alter her status of divorcee in respect of her former husband himself (for the reason stated supra) it does remove it as far as marriage with his brother is concerned. She is, as a result of her mi'un, no longer regarded as his brother's divorcee.
  51. And since it is only this familiarity that is the cause of the prohibition, it is obvious that where it does not apply there should be no prohibition.
  52. Lit., 'this'.
  53. V. p. 755, n. 13.
  54. The husband who divorced her.
  55. Cf. supra p. 755, n. 16. Why then should she be forbidden to marry them?