Babylonian Talmud: Tractate Shabbath

Folio 71a

then [atonement for] the [first] reaping involves [atonement for] the [second] reaping and [atonement for] the [first] grinding involves [atonement for] the [second] grinding.¹  But if he was [first] apprised of his reaping [performed] in awareness of the Sabbath but unawareness in respect of labours: then [atonement for] this [second] reaping involves [atonement for] the [first] reaping and its accompanying grinding;²  but the corresponding [second] grinding remains in its place.³  Abaye maintained: [Atonement for the first] grinding involves atonement for the second grinding too: the designation of grinding is the same.⁴

Now, does then Raba hold the theory of involvement?⁵  But it was stated: If one eats two olive-sized pieces of heleb⁶  in one state of unawareness,⁷  is apprised of one of them, and then eats another olive-sized piece whilst still unaware of the second — Raba said: If he offers a sacrifice for the first, the first and second are expiated,⁸  but the third is not. If he brings a sacrifice for the third, the third and second are expiated, but not the first. If he offers a sacrifice for the middle one, all are atoned for.⁹  Abaye maintained: Even if he offers a sacrifice for the first, all are expiated! — After hearing from Abaye he adopted it. If so, let grinding too be carried along with grinding?¹⁰  — He accepts the theory of [direct], but not that of indirect involvement.¹¹ 

The matter that is clear to Abaye and Raba¹²  was a problem to R. Zera: For R. Zera asked R. Assi — others state, R. Jeremiah asked R. Zera: What if one reaped or¹³  ground [corn] of the quantity of half a dried fig in unawareness of the Sabbath but awareness in respect of the labours, then he again reaped or ground [corn] of the quantity of half a dried fig in awareness of the Sabbath but unawareness in respect of the labours; can they be combined?¹⁴  — Said he to him: They are distinct in respect of sin-offerings,¹⁵  therefore they do not combine.¹⁶

Now, wherever [acts] are distinct in respect of sin-offerings, do they not combine? Surely we learnt: If one eats heleb and [then again] heleb in one state of unawareness, he is culpable for only one [sin-offering]. If one eats heleb, blood, nothar, and piggul¹⁷  in one state of unawareness, he is culpable for each separately: in this many kinds [of forbidden food] are more stringent then one kind. — But in the following one kind is more stringent than many kinds: viz., if one eats half the size of an olive and then eats half the size of an olive of the same kind of [commodity],¹⁸  he is culpable; of two different commodities, he is not culpable. Now we questioned this: 'of the same commodity, he is culpable': need this be stated?¹⁹  And Resh Lakish said on the authority of Bar Tutani: The reference here is to one e.g., who ate [them] from two tureens,²⁰  this being according to R. Joshua, who ruled: Tureens divide.²¹  You might say that R. Joshua rules [thus] whether it leads to leniency or to stringency: hence we are informed that he did not rule thus leniently, but only stringently.²²  Thus here, though distinct in respect of sin-offerings, yet they combine? — Said he to him: You learn this in reference to the first clause: hence it presents a difficulty to you.²³  But we learn it in reference to the second clause, and it presents no difficulty to us. [Thus:] 'Of two kinds of [commodities], he is not culpable': need this be said? And Resh Lakish answered on the authority of Bar Tutani: After all, it means of the same kind of [commodity]. Yet why is it designated two kinds of [commodities]? Because he ate them out of two tureens, this agreeing with R. Joshua, who maintained: Tureens divide, and we are informed this: that R. Joshua ruled [thus] both leniently and stringently. Now, since the second clause refers to one kind of [commodity] and two tureens,

1. In respect to expiation. The sacrifice for his first two acts of reaping and grinding is an atonement for his second two acts, since all were performed in one state of unawareness, without any appraisement in the interval, notwithstanding that his first unawareness differed in kind from his second unawareness.
2. When he makes atonement for his second reaping he automatically makes atonement for the first too, and since his first reaping and grinding only necessitate one sacrifice, his first grinding too is atoned for thereby.
3. Unatoned for, until another sacrifice is brought.
4. I.e., all acts of grinding made in one state of unawareness are covered by this sacrifice, though it is not primarily offered on account of grinding at all.
5. That atonement for one involves atonement for the other, as above.
6. This is the minimum quantity of forbidden food the eating of which entails a sacrifice.
7. Not being apprised in between that he had eaten heleb.
8. Since they were eaten in one state of unawareness.
9. Since both the first and the third were eaten in the state of unawareness of the second. — The first two rulings show that he rejects the theory of involvement.
10. As Abaye rules above.
11. Lit., 'involvement of involvement'. Thus the first act of grinding is atoned for only because it is involved in the atonement for reaping; hence this in turn cannot involve the second act of grinding.
12. Viz., that awareness of the Sabbath and ignorance of the forbidden nature of one's labours followed by the reverse constitute a single state of unawareness, though the first differs in kind from the second, and the two states or periods are not separate in respect to sacrifice, but sacrifice for one makes atonement for the other.
13. The context shows that the waw is disjunctive here, and it is thus translated by Rashi.
14. Viz., the two reapings or the two acts of grinding. Is it all regarded as a single state of unawareness, so that they do combine, or as two states of unawareness, since they differ in kind and they do not combine? Thus he was doubtful of what was clear to Abaye and Raba.
15. Had each reaping been sufficient to entail a sin-offering, a sacrifice for one would not make atonement for the other. He thus differs from Abaye and Raba.
16. Hence there is no liability.
17. V. Glos.
18. The overall time being less than is required for the eating of half an average meal. It is then regarded as one act of eating.
19. It is obvious.
20. I.e., the two pieces of heleb were differently prepared.
21. If one eats two pieces, each the size of an olive, out of different tureens, in one state of unawareness, they are treated as two separate acts, and he must make atonement on account of each.
22. Therefore the two half-olive sized pieces combine, though they are of two tureens.
23. Since it must be explained as treating of two tureen.

it follows that the first clause treats of one kind of [commodity] and one tureen. But if it is one kind of [commodity] and one tureen, need it be stated?¹  — Said R. Huna: The circumstances here dealt with are e.g., that he was aware in between,²  this agreeing with Rabban³  Gamaliel, who maintained: Knowledge of half the standard quantity is of no consequence.⁴

It was stated: If one eats two olive-sized pieces of heleb in one state of unawareness, is apprised of the first and subsequently of the second, — R. Johanan maintains: He is liable to two [sin-offerings]; while Resh Lakish rules: He is liable to one only. R. Johanan maintains: He is liable [for the second], [deducing] for his sin … he shall bring [a sacrifice].⁵  While Resh Lakish rules, He is not liable [for the second], [interpreting,] of his sin … and he shall be forgiven.⁶  But according to Resh Lakish too, surely it is written, 'for his sin … he shall bring?' — That holds good after atonement.⁷  But according to R. Johanan too, surely it is written, 'of his sin … and he shall be forgiven'? — That refers to one e.g., who ate an olive and a half [of heleb],⁸  was apprised concerning the size of an olive,⁹  and then ate again as much as half an olive in the unawareness of the second [half].¹⁰  Now you might say, let these combine; therefore it¹¹  informs us [otherwise].¹²

Rabina asked R. Ashi: Do they disagree where it [the eating of the second piece] became known to him before setting apart [a sacrifice] for the first, and they differ in this: one Master holds, Appraisements divide,¹³  whilst the other Master holds, [Only] separations [of sacrifices] divide;¹⁴  but if [he learnt of the second piece] after setting apart [a sacrifice for the first], Resh Lakish concedes to R. Johanan that he is liable to two. Or perhaps they disagree where it became known to him after the act of setting apart, and they differ in this: One Master holds, Separations [of sacrifices] divide, while the other Master holds, [Only] acts of atonement divide;¹⁵  but if [he learnt of the second piece] before setting apart [a sacrifice for the first], R. Johanan concedes to Resh Lakish that he is liable only to one [sacrifice]. Or perhaps they differ in both cases? — Said he to him: It is logical that they differ in both cases. For should you think that they differ before the setting apart of a sacrifice, whereas after 'setting apart' Resh Lakish concedes to R. Johanan that he is liable to two sacrifices, — then instead of interpreting the verse as referring to after atonement, let him interpret it as referring to after 'setting apart'.¹⁶  Whilst if they differ after 'setting apart', whereas before separation R. Johanan agrees with Resh Lakish that he is liable only to one [sacrifice]; — instead of interpreting the verse as referring to [one who ate] as much as an olive and a half, let him relate it to [apprisement of the second] before 'setting apart'? But perhaps that itself is in doubt, and it is hypothetically stated.¹⁷  [Thus:] if you assume that they differ before 'setting apart', how can R. Johanan interpret the verse? As referring to [one who ate] the quantity of an olive and a half. And if you assume that they differ after separation, how can Resh Lakish interpret the verse? As referring to after atonement.

'Ulla said: On the view that a certain guilt-offering does not require previous knowledge:¹⁸

1. Surely his culpability is obvious!
2. That he had eaten heleb.
3. A higher title than 'Rabbi'.
4. I.e., it does not separate two acts of eating, when in each case only half the standard quantity to create liability is consumed.
5. Lev. IV, 28, q.v. I.e., for each sin a separate sacrifice is required.
6. Ibid. 35. 'Of' (Heb. n ) is interpreted partitively: i.e., even if he offers a sacrifice for part of his sin only, he is forgiven for the whole.
7. If he offends a second time after having atoned for the first, he must make atonement again.
8. At once, though the heleb was not in one piece.
9. That that amount of the fat was heleb.
10. Which was eaten the first time.
11. The verse quoted by Resh Lakish.
12. As in n. 2.
13. I.e., the knowledge first obtained concerning one piece separates this piece from the second, and necessitates a sacrifice for each.
14. And since a sacrifice was not set apart — i.e., separated — until he learnt of the second piece, it atones for both.
15. V. n. 3.
16. Even before it was actually sacrificed.
17. Lit., 'and he says, "should you say".'
18. There are two classes of guilt-offerings (Heb. asham, pl. ashamoth): (i) A guilt-offering of doubt. This is due when one is doubtful if he has committed a sin which, when certainly committed, entails a sin-offering. (ii) A certain guilt-offering. This is due for the undoubted commission of certain offences, viz., (a) robbery (after restoration is made, v. Lev. V, 25); (b) misappropriation of sacred property to secular uses (Lev. V, 16); (c) coition with a bondmaid betrothed to another (Lev. XIX, 21); (d) a nazirite's interrupting of the days of his purity by permitting himself to be ritually defiled (Num. VI, 12); and (e) a leper's guilt-offering (Lev. XIV, 12). Now with respect to b, the Rabbis hold that no guilt-offering is incurred for doubtful misappropriation, whilst R. Akiba and R. Tarfon hold that one can bring a guilt-offering conditionally, stating: 'If I learn at some future date that I was definitely guilty, let this be accounted now as a certain guilt-offering. But if I am destined to remain in doubt, let this be a guilt-offering of doubt'. Thus on the first hypothesis a certain guilt-offering is brought, though at the time one has no knowledge whether he has actually sinned. — This follows Tosaf. Rashi holds that R. Akiba and R. Tarfon differ in this very question.