Babylonian Talmud: Tractate Niddah

Folio 46a

R. Nahman stated, The question¹⁰  is a point at issue between Tannas:¹¹  [For it was taught:] If a boy of the age of seven years grew two hairs they are attributed to a mole;¹²  from the age of nine years to that of twelve years and one day they are also to be attributed to a mole,¹²  but R. Jose son of R. Judah ruled: They¹³  are a sign of puberty; at the age of thirteen years and one day, all agree that they are a sign of puberty.¹⁴  Now is not this self-contradictory: You said, 'From the age of nine years to that of twelve years and one day they are also to be attributed to a mole', from which it follows that at the actual age of thirteen years they are a sign of puberty; but then it is stated, 'At the age of thirteen years and one day … they are a sign of puberty', from which it follows, does it not, that at the actual age of thirteen years they are to be attributed to a mole? Must you not concede then that this question¹⁵  is a point at issue between the Tannas, one Master¹⁶  holding that the intervening period is regarded as that of over age while the other Master maintains that the intervening period is regarded as that of under age?¹⁷  No; all may agree that the intervening period is regarded as that under age, but both clauses refer to a girl the first¹⁸  supporting the view of Rabbi¹⁹  while the latter²⁰  represents that of R. Simeon b. Eleazar.²¹  And if you prefer I²²  might reply: Both clauses refer to a boy, and the first represents the view of R. Simeon b. Eleazar while the latter represents the view of Rabbi.²³  And if you prefer I²⁴  might reply: Both clauses are the view of Rabbi, but one²⁵  refers to a boy while the other²⁶  refers to a girl. And if you prefer I²⁴  might say: Both clauses are the view of R. Simeon b. Eleazar, but the one²⁶  refers to a boy while the other²⁵  refers to a girl.

'R. Jose son of R. Judah ruled: They are a sign of puberty.' R. Keruspedai son of R. Shabbethai explained: This applies only where they²⁷  are still on him.²⁸  So it was also taught: If a boy of the age of nine years and one day had grown two hairs they are to be attributed to a mole; from the age of nine years to that of twelve years and one day, though the hairs are still on him, they are to be attributed to a mole. R. Jose son of R. Judah ruled: They are a sign of puberty.

Raba stated: The law is that the intervening period is regarded as that of under age. R. Samuel b. Zutra taught Raba's tradition in the following form:²⁹  Raba stated, A minor all through her twelfth year may make a declaration of mi'un³⁰  and go away,³¹  but from that age upwards she may not make a declaration of mi'un³²  but³³  she may not submit to halizah.³⁴  Is not this statement, however, self contradictory? You said, 'she may not make a declaration of mi'un' from which it is evident that³⁵  she is regarded as one of age; but if she is of age why may she not submit to halizah? And were you to reply that he³⁶  was in doubt,³⁷  [it could be retorted:] Was he in doubt? Did not Raba in fact rule: A minor on attaining the age of majority need not be examined³⁸  since there is presumption that she has grown the signs of puberty? — This³⁹  applies only to general cases, but not here where an examination was held and no hairs were found. If so,⁴⁰  why should she not be allowed to make a declaration of mi'un? The possibility is taken into consideration that they might have fallen off. This would be a satisfactory explanation according to him who holds that such a possibility is taken into consideration, but what explanation can be offered according to him who holds that such a possibility need not be taken into consideration? Was it not stated: R. Kahana⁴¹  ruled, There is no need to consider the possibility that they may have fallen off and R. Papi ruled, The possibility must be considered? — This⁴²  applies only to the matter of halizah,⁴³  but as regards mi'un the possibility is taken into consideration.⁴⁴  Thus it follows that according to him who holds that the possibility⁴⁵  is taken into consideration she may submit to halizah; but [it may be objected:] Did he not merely say that the possibility⁴⁶  is taken into consideration?⁴⁷  The fact is that this⁴⁸  is a case where she was not examined,⁴⁹  but the possibility⁵⁰  is taken into consideration as regards halizah,⁵¹  and when Raba stated 'There is presumption' he meant it in regard to mi'un,⁵²  but in regard to halizah⁵³  an examination⁵⁴  is a pre-requisite. R. Dimi of Nehardea stated: The law is that the possibility that the hairs may have fallen off is taken into consideration.⁵⁵  This,⁵⁶  however, applies only where one had betrothed her⁵⁷  during the intervening period and cohabited after that period, since a Pentateuchal doubt is thereby involved,⁵⁸  but not to the original betrothal alone.⁵⁹

R. Huna ruled: If [a child]⁶⁰  dedicated some food and then ate it, he⁶¹  is subject to flogging, for it is said in Scripture, When… man … shall clearly utter a vow,⁶²  and He shall not break his word,⁶³  which⁶⁴  implies that whosoever is able to 'utter clearly'⁶⁵  is subject to the prohibition of 'he shall not break his word'⁶⁶  and only he who is not able to 'utter clearly' is not subject to the injunction of 'he shall not break his word'. R. Huna b. Judah addressed an objection to⁶⁷  Raba⁶⁸  in support of R. Huna:

1. Cf. prev. n.
2. Age and external marks of puberty.
3. Lit., 'when the thing was completed'.
4. When the prescribed age limit had not yet been reached.
5. An objection against R. Johanan, and R. Joshua b. Levi.
6. Num. VI, 2.
7. How then could his vow be valid?
8. Since the law is applicable only to one who is above the age of thirteen years and a day.
9. An objection against R. Johanan. and R. Joshua b. Levi.
10. To which age the intervening period belongs.
11. Lit., 'as Tannas'.
12. From which hair grows; and they are, therefore, no evidence of puberty.
13. In the latter case, from nine years to twelve years and a day.
14. Kid. 16b.
15. To which age the intervening period belongs.
16. The first Tanna.
17. Which proves R. Nahman's contention.
18. According to which the growth of the hairs at the age of thirteen years is sufficient evidence.
19. Who stated supra that in the case of a girl the age of thirteen years is regarded as over the prescribed age.
20. From which it is inferred that the growth of hairs at the age of thirteen is attributed to a mole.
21. Who, as stated supra, regards a girl at the age of thirteen years as being under the age prescribed.
22. Still maintaining that the intervening period is regarded as that of under age.
23. V. supra 45b.
24. Still maintaining that the intervening period is regarded as that of under age.
25. The last clause.
26. The first clause.
27. The two hairs.
28. When he attained his majority. If by that time they have fallen off it is obvious that their growth was merely due to a mole.
29. From which also it may be inferred that the intervening period is regarded as that of under age.
30. V. Glos.
31. And there is no need to consider the possibility that she may have grown two hairs. If any hairs had grown they must be attributed to a mole. It thus follows that the intervening period is regarded as that of under age.
32. Since at this age the possibility must be considered that she may have grown two hairs.
33. If her husband died childless.
34. Because her majority is not yet established.
35. If she has grown two hairs.
36. Raba.
37. Whether a girl at such an age had, or had not grown pubic hairs; and consequently he forbade mi'un in case she was already of age, and forbade halizah in case she was still a minor.
38. For the presence of hairs.
39. Raba's ruling just cited.
40. That an examination has established the absence of hairs.
41. So MS.M. and marg. gl. Cur. edd. 'Papa'.
42. That where no hairs were found there is no need to consider the possibility that they may have fallen off.
43. Since by forbidding it the law is thereby restricted.
44. And mi'un is, therefore, forbidden and (cf. prev. n. mut. mut.) only a proper divorce can dissolve the marriage.
45. That the hairs may have fallen off.
46. Emphasis on this word.
47. Of course he said. How then can he allow halizah when the question of majority is still a matter of doubt?
48. Raba's ruling just cited.
49. And as she has attained the age of majority, when she might be presumed to have grown pubic hairs, she must be forbidden mi'un and subjected to the restrictions of divorce.
50. That she never grew pubic hairs.
51. And he cannot submit to halizah in order to be exempt from divorce. Since the law must always be restricted.
52. Cf. prev. n. but two.
53. Sc. to allow her to submit to halizah and be exempt from divorce (cf. prev. n. but one).
54. To establish the presence of hair.
55. Once she has attained the age of majority, though on examination no hairs are found, she may no longer exercise the right of mi'un.
56. Cf. prev. n.
57. With the approval of her mother or brothers.
58. Cohabitation, which is a Pentateuchal form of 'acquisition' in marriage, having taken place at an age when she may well be presumed to have attained her majority.
59. That was not followed by cohabitation after the age of majority had been attained. As the betrothal of a minor (if it was not effected through her father) has only Rabbinical sanction, the Rabbis did not insist on the restrictions of a divorce where her majority was in doubt. Where, however, hairs have grown, though betrothal took place during her minority, the Rabbis forbade mi'un and insisted on the restrictions of a divorce as a preventive measure against the possibility of allowing mi'un to one with whom cohabitation took place after majority had been attained.
60. Who understands the significance of dedications and vows.
61. Though exempt from penalties in other cases.
62. Num. VI, 2, from which it is deduced that a minor approaching manhood (or womanhood), viz., a boy in his thirteenth year (or a girl in her twelfth), provided he (or she) understands the significance of vows and dedications, is regarded as a man (or woman).
63. Num. XXX, 3.
64. By analogy.
65. Sc. understands the significance of vows.
66. A negative precept punishable by flogging.
67. Not 'against'.
68. MS.M. and Maharsha delete the last two words the Heb. for which in cur. edd. is enclosed in parenthesis. [The objection is against those who hold infra that others who ate it are subject to flagellation but not the child. V. Maharsha].

[Reverting to] the above text, 'If a minor dedicated some food and others ate it, R. Kahana ruled, They are not to be flogged, while both R. Johanan and Resh Lakish ruled, They are to be flogged'. On what principle do they differ? — The Masters²³  are of the opinion that an intelligent minor approaching manhood is under a Pentateuchal obligation²⁴  while the Master²⁵  is of the opinion that an intelligent minor approaching manhood is only under a Rabbinical obligation.²⁴  R. Jeremiah raised an objection: If a fatherless girl²⁶  made a vow, her husband may disallow it for her. Now if you grant that an intelligent minor approaching manhood is only under a Rabbinical obligation²⁴  one can well justify the ruling,²⁷  since the force of a Rabbinical marriage²⁸  may well annul a Rabbinical vow, but if you maintain that the obligation²⁴  is Pentateuchal, could [it may be objected] the force of a Rabbinical marriage²⁹  annul a Pentateuchal vow? — R. Judah citing Samuel replied: Her husband may disallow her vow for her whatever your assumption might be. If the minor's obligation²⁴  is Rabbinical, the whole matter is a Rabbinical affair; and if the obligation is Pentateuchal, it is a case of a minor who eats nebelah³⁰  where it is not the duty of the Beth din to take it away from him. But would she not be eating, in reliance upon the first disallowance,³¹  even when she attains her majority?³²  — Rabbah b. Liwai replied: Her husband disallows her vow for her every now and then.³³  This,³⁴  however, applies only to one who cohabited with her.³⁵  But, surely, no husband may disallow vows made prior to marriage?³⁶  — This³⁷  is in agreement with R. Phinehas who cited Raba,³⁸  for R. Phinehas citing Raba stated: Any woman who vows acts in reliance on the opinion of her husband.³⁹

Said Abaye, Come and hear: If a minor has not yet grown two hairs, R. Judah ruled, his terumah is not⁴⁰  valid; while R. Jose ruled, Before reaching the age when his vows are valid⁴¹  his terumah is not valid, but after reaching the age when his vows are valid⁴²  his terumah is valid.⁴³  Assuming⁴⁴  that R. Jose is of the opinion that terumah at the present time is a Pentateuchal institution, his ruling would be well justified if you grant that an intelligent minor approaching manhood is under a Pentateuchal obligation,⁴⁵  since a man under a Pentateuchal obligation may well render fit⁴⁶  Pentateuchal tebel,⁴⁷  but if you maintain that he is only under a Rabbinical obligation,⁴⁸  could a man under a Rabbinical obligation render fit Pentateuchal tebel?⁴⁹  — No, R. Jose is of the opinion that terumah at the present time is only a Rabbinical institution. But does R. Jose hold that terumah at the present time is only Rabbinical? Was it not in fact taught in Seder Olam:⁵⁰  'Which thy fathers possessed and thou shalt possess it,⁵¹  they had a first,⁵²  and a second⁵³  possession⁵⁴  but they had no need for a third one';⁵⁵  and R. Johanan stated, 'Who is the author of Seder Olam? R. Jose?'⁵⁶  — R. Jose may well be its compiler⁵⁷  but he himself does not uphold this view.⁵⁸  This⁵⁹  may also be supported by a process of reasoning. For it was taught: A dough⁶⁰  that had become subject to the restrictions of terumah⁶¹  or became sour through a leaven of terumah,

1. Cf. supra n. 9.
2. V. Num. XXX, 3.
3. In the same context as the oath and a self-imposed prohibition.
4. Num. XXX, 2, emphasis on 'this', sc. but no other.
5. Evidently it was; but since such a negative precept is punishable by flogging, R. Huna's ruling evidently finds support in the citation.
6. Issur instead of issar ('bond', self-imposed prohibition).
7. Without incurring a flogging.
8. Sc. one understanding the significance of vows and dedications.
9. As in the case of all Pentateuchal prohibitions.
10. Since the Rabbis do not subject minors to preventive measures.
11. Issur (cf. prev. n. but three).
12. Spoken of supra, which is in fact only Rabbinical.
13. Not to the minor himself (cf. prev. n. but two).
14. According to which those responsible for a minor must prevent him from encroaching even on that which is only Rabbinically forbidden.
15. Symbolic of any religious transgression.
16. But if so why (cf. Yeb. 114a) was there a divergence of view on this question?
17. Adults.
18. The original reading, 'prohibition and [the injunction] not to break', may, therefore, be retained and yet no support would be forthcoming for R. Huna since the penalty of flogging does not apply to the minor but to the adults who ate that which he has dedicated.
19. Sc. 'the prohibition not to break his vow'.
20. According to R. Kahana.
21. As was first suggested supra.
22. From which deduction was made supra 46a ad fin.
23. R. Johanan and Resh Lakish.
24. To observe the laws of vows and dedications.
25. R. Kahana.
26. A minor whose marriage was contracted by her mother or brothers.
27. The husband's right by virtue of his marriage with the minor (cf. prev. n.) to disallow her vows.
28. The marriage of a minor contracted in the absence of her father has only Rabbinical sanction.
29. Cf. prev. n.
30. Cf. supra p. 322, n. 14.
31. Which has only Rabbinical validity.
32. When she is subject to Pentateuchal prohibitions.
33. Even after she has attained her majority.
34. That the disallowance has Pentateuchal force.
35. After she had attained majority. Cohabitation at that age having the Pentateuchal force of 'acquisition' the marriage which thus has Pentateuchal sanction may well enable the husband to disallow a vow that has Pentateuchal sanction.
36. How then can he disallow here a vow that was made by a minor before her subsequent Pentateuchally valid marriage?
37. The ruling that the husband may disallow the minor's vow though when she comes of age her vow would assume Pentateuchal validity.
38. Sc. there is no need to explain, as presumably suggested, that the husband 'disallows the vow every now and then', for even though he only disallowed it during her minority, there is no need to disallow it again when she attains her majority.
39. As the minor was at least Rabbinically married when her vow was made, its validity is entirely dependent on her husband's pleasure. Only where a woman was not married at all at the time her vow was made is her subsequently married husband precluded from disallowing it.
40. In the separate edd. of the Mishnah this word is missing.
41. V. foll. n.
42. Sc. an intelligent minor approaching manhood whose vows are to be examined.
43. Ter. I, 3.
44. Lit., 'they (the Rabbis of the college) thought'.
45. In regard to his vows and dedications and consequently also in regard to his terumah.
46. By separating terumah from it.
47. Sc. produce the separation of terumah from which is Pentateuchally ordained, v. Glos.
48. As R. Kahana maintains.
49. An objection against R. Kahana.
50. 'Order of the World', a chronological compilation by R. Jose b. Halafta in the first half of the second century.
51. Deut. XXX, 5, repetition of the verb 'to possess'.
52. After the conquest of Joshua'.
53. In the days of Ezra.
54. Sc. the sanctity of the Land of Israel having ceased with the destruction of the first Temple and the Babylonian exile, a second 'possession' (sc. sanctification) was necessary.
55. Since the second sanctification (as the Scriptural text implies) remained for all time. As the land remained sacred the Pentateuchal obligation of terumah also obviously remained in force.
56. How then (cf. prev. n.) could it be maintained here that R. Jose holds the institution of terumah at the present time to be merely Rabbinical?
57. Lit., 'taught it'.
58. That the second sanctification remained for all time. He may well be of the opinion that it ceased with the destruction of the second Temple and the Roman exile and that terumah at the present time is merely a Rabbinical institution.
59. Cf. prev. n.
60. Ordinary and unconsecrated.
61. Where for instance, some terumah fell into a dough that was less than a hundred times the quantity of the former. Rabbinically, terumah cannot be neutralized unless it was mixed up with unconsecrated commodities that exceeded its quantity a hundredfold.