Babylonian Talmud: Tractate Kethuboth

Folio 71a

[a repetition of] the incident of Beth Horon.¹

R. JUDAH SAID: IF HE WAS AN ISRAELITE HE MAY KEEP HER [AS HIS WIFE, IF THE PROHIBITION WAS FOR] ONE MONTH etc. Is not this the same ruling as that of the first Tanna?²  — Abaye replied: He³  came to teach us [the law concerning] a priest's wife.⁴  Raba replied: The difference between them is a full month⁵  and a defective month.⁶

Rab stated: This⁷  was taught only in the case of a man who specified [the period of the prohibition], but where he did not specify, he⁸  must divorce her immediately and give her the kethubah. Samuel, however, stated: Even where the period was not specified [the husband] need not divorce her, since it is possible that he might discover some reason⁹  for [the remission of] his vow.¹⁰  But surely they¹¹  had once been in dispute upon this principle; for have we not learned, 'If a man forbade his wife by vow to have intercourse, Beth Shammai ruled: [She must consent to the deprivation for] two weeks; Beth Hillel ruled: [Only for] one week';¹²  and Rab stated, 'They¹³  differ only in the case of a man who specified [the period of abstention] but where he did not specify the period he¹⁴  must divorce her forthwith and give her the kethubah', and Samuel stated, 'Even where the period had not been specified the husband need not divorce her, since it might be possible for him to discover some reason¹⁵  for [the annulment of] his¹⁶  vow'?¹⁷  — [Both disputes were] necessary. For if [their views] had been expressed in the former case¹⁸  it might have been assumed that only in that case did Rab maintain his view, since [the appointment] of a steward is not possible, but that in the latter case¹⁹  where [the appointment] of a steward is possible, he agrees with Samuel. And if [their views] had been stated in the latter case¹⁹  it might have been assumed that only in that case did Samuel maintain his view, since the appointment of a steward is possible. but that in the former case¹⁸  he agrees with Rab. [Hence both statements were] necessary.

We learned: IF A MAN FORBADE HIS WIFE BY VOW THAT SHE SHOULD NOT TASTE A CERTAIN FRUIT, HE MUST DIVORCE HER²⁰  AND GIVE HER THE KETHUBAH. Now according to Rab²¹  [there is no contradiction²²  since] the latter²³  may apply to a man who did not specify [the period of the prohibition] and the former²³  to a man who did specify [the period]. According to Samuel,²⁴  however, a contradiction arises!²²  — Here we are dealing with a case, for instance, where the woman made the vow and he confirmed it;²⁵  R. Meir²⁶  holding the opinion that [the husband]²⁷  had himself put his finger between her teeth. But does R. Meir hold the principle, 'He has himself put his finger between her teeth'? Surely it was taught: If a woman made the vow of a nazirite²⁸  and her husband heard of it and did not annul it, she, said R. Meir and R. Judah, has thereby put her own finger between her teeth. Therefore, if the husband wishes to annul her vow, he may do so. But if he²⁹  said, 'I do not want a wife who is in the habit of vowing'. she may be divorced without [receiving] her kethubah. R. Jose and R. Eleazar said: He³⁰  has put his finger between her teeth. Therefore, if the husband wishes to annul her vow, he may do so. But if he³¹  said, 'I do not want a wife who is in the habit of vowing', he may divorce her but must give her the kethubah!³²  — Reverse [the views]: R. Meir and R. Judah said: 'He has put'³³  and R. Jose and R. Eleazar said: 'She has put'.³⁴  But is R. Jose of the opinion that it is she who put?³⁴  Have we not learned: R. Jose ruled: [THIS³⁵  APPLIES] TO POOR WOMEN IF NO TIME LIMIT IS GIVEN?³⁶  — Read: R. Meir and R. Jose said, 'He has put';³³  R. Judah and R. Eleazar said, 'She has put'.³⁴  But does R. Judah uphold the principle of 'She put'?³⁴  Have we not learned: R. JUDAH RULED: IF HE WAS AN ISRAELITE HE MAY KEEP HER [AS HIS WIFE, IF THE VOW WAS FOR] ONE DAY?³⁷  — Read: R. Meir and R. Judah and R. Jose said, 'He put'.³³  and R. Eleazar said, 'She put'.³⁴  And should you find [some ground] for insisting that the names must appear in pairs,³⁸  then read: R. Meir and R. Eleazar said, 'She put',³⁹  and R. Judah and R. Jose said, 'He put';⁴⁰  and this anonymous Mishnah⁴¹  is not in agreement with R. Meir.

Is R. Jose, however, of the opinion that [THIS⁴²  APPLIES] TO POOR WOMEN IF NO TIME LIMIT IS GIVEN; from which⁴³  it is evident that a husband has the right to annul⁴³  [such vows]?⁴⁴  This, surely, is incongruous [with the following]. These are the vows⁴⁵  which a husband may annul: Vows which involve an affliction of soul⁴⁶  [as, for instance, if a woman said, 'I vow not to enjoy the pleasure of bathing] should I bathe'⁴⁷  [or] 'I swear that⁴⁸  I shall not bathe', [or again, 'I vow not to make use of adornments] should I make use of an adornment',⁴⁷  [or] 'I swear that⁴⁸  I shall not make use of any adornments'. R. Jose said: These are not regarded as vows involving an affliction of soul;⁴⁹  and the following are vows that involve an affliction of soul: '[I swear] that I shall not eat meat' or 'that I shall not drink wine' or 'that I shall not adorn myself

1. V. Ned. Sonc. ed. p. 148f and notes.
2. Who also allowed a period of THIRTY DAYS.
3. R. Judah.
4. of which the first Tanna does not speak.
5. Consisting of thirty days.
6. Of twenty-nine days. According to R. Judah ONE MONTH is allowed irrespective of whether it is a full or a defective one. According to the first Tanna THIRTY DAYS are invariably allowed.
7. That for a period of thirty days a steward may be appointed.
8. Though his vow might be annulled by a competent authority by the end of the thirty days.
9. Lit., 'a door'.
10. V. supra p. 370. nn. 10-11.
11. Rab and Samuel.
12. Supra 61b.
13. Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel.
14. According to the opinion of both.
15. V. supra note 10.
16. V. supra. p. 370, n. 11
17. Why then should Rab and Samuel be in dispute upon the same principle here also?
18. The prohibition of intercourse.
19. The vow forbidding other benefits.
20. Forthwith.
21. Who draws a distinction between a specified and an unspecified period.
22. Between this ruling (immediate divorce) and the earlier Mishnah (allowing a certain period to pass).
23. Lit., 'here'.
24. Who, contrary to the view of Rab (v. supra n. 4), draws no distinction.
25. Since if she is willing to accept her kethubah and leave him, she would not try to obtain the annulment of her vow. There is no advantage, therefore, in postponing the divorce. Where, however, he himself made the vow, the divorce is delayed in order to afford him an opportunity of discovering some ground for the remission of his vow.
26. Who is generally the author of an anonymous Mishnah.
27. By confirming her vow though he had the right to annul it.
28. V. Num. VI, 2ff.
29. Having once confirmed the vow.
30. V. supra p. 440, n. 10.
31. Having once confirmed the vow.
32. Which shews that R. Meir's view is that she and not he has put the finger between the teeth, where she makes the vow and he confirms it.
33. His finger between her teeth.
34. Her finger between her teeth.
35. That the husband must divorce her and give her the kethubah.
36. This referring (as has been explained supra) to a vow the woman had made, it follows that according to R. Jose it is the husband who puts his finger between her teeth.
37. But if for more than ONE DAY be must divorce her and give her the kethubah. This referring to a vow the woman has made, it follows that according to R. Judah also it is the husband who put his finger etc. (v. supra n. 7).
38. Lit., 'to say: He taught in pairs'.
39. Her finger between her teeth.
40. V. supra note 3.
41. Which follows the principle that it is the husband who 'put his finger between her teeth'.
42. That a husband must divorce his wife and also give her the kethubah if he has not annulled a vow she has made against the use of a certain adornment.
43. Since the husband is penalized (v. supra n. 13) for not annulling the vow.
44. I.e., those relating to a woman's adornments.
45. So MS.M. and separate edd. of the Mishnah. Cur. edd., 'things'.
46. V. Num. XXX, 14.
47. 'Up to a certain time'.
48. Lit., 'if'.
49. Hence they may not be annulled by a husband. V. Ned. Mishnah 79a; cf. however next note. [The passage that follows does not occur in the Mishnah Ned. 79a and the source of the whole citation is consequently, according to some commentators, said to be a Baraitha (v. Shittah Mekubbezeth). Tosaf. however (s.v. [H]) on the basis of an entirely different text, omits this passage.]

with coloured garments'!¹  — Here²  we are dealing with matters affecting their intimate relations.³  This explanation is satisfactory according to him who maintains that a husband may annul [vows on] matters affecting their intimate relations. — What, however, can be said [in explanation] according to him who maintains that a husband may not annul [such vows]? For it was stated:⁴  [As to vows on] matters affecting their intimate relations, R. Huna ruled: A husband may annul them; R. Adda b. Ahabah ruled: A husband may not annul them, for we do not find that a fox should die of the dust of his den!⁵  — The fact, however, is that we are here²  dealing with a case, for instance, where she made her marital intercourse dependent upon her use of adornments, by saying. 'The enjoyment of your intercourse shall be forbidden to me should I ever make use of any adornment.'⁶  [This explanation] is in agreement with a ruling of R. Kahana. For R. Kahana ruled, [If a woman said to her husband]. 'The enjoyment of my intercourse [shall be forbidden]⁷  to you', he may compel her to such intercourse;⁸  [if, however, she vowed,] 'The enjoyment of your intercourse [shall be forbidden]⁹  to me'¹⁰  he must annul [her vow]¹¹  because no person is to be fed with a thing that is forbidden to him.¹²  But let her¹³  not adorn herself and consequently not be forbidden to him!¹⁴  — If so,¹⁵  she would be called, 'The ugly woman'.¹⁶  But then let her adorn herself and be forbidden [intercourse] either for two weeks, according to Beth Shammai¹⁷  or for one week according to Beth Hillel!'¹⁸  — These¹⁹  apply only to a case where he [the husband] has forbidden her by a vow [to have intercourse with him], because [in such circumstances] she thinks 'He may have been angry with me²⁰  and will later²¹  calm down'.²²  Here, however, since she has made the vow and he remained silent,²³  she comes to the conclusion: 'Since he remained silent²³  he must indeed hate me'.²⁴

R. JOSE RULED: [THIS APPLIES] TO POOR WOMEN IF NO TIME LIMIT IS GIVEN. What is the TIME LIMIT?²⁵  — Rab Judah citing Samuel replied: Twelve months.²⁶  Rabbah b. Bar Hana citing R. Johanan replied: Ten years.²⁶  R. Hisda citing Abimi replied: A festival;²⁷  for²⁸  the daughters of Israel adorn themselves on a festival.

AND TO RICH WOMEN [IF THE TIME LIMIT IS] THIRTY DAYS. Why just²⁹  THIRTY DAYS? — Abaye replied: Because²⁸  a prominent woman enjoys the scent of her cosmetics for thirty days.³⁰

MISHNAH. IF A MAN FORBADE HIS WIFE³¹  BY VOW THAT SHE SHALL NOT GO TO HER FATHER'S HOUSE, AND HE³²  LIVES WITH HER IN THE SAME TOWN, HE MAY KEEP [HER AS HIS WIFE, IF THE PROHIBITION WAS FOR] ONE MONTH; BUT IF FOR TWO MONTHS HE MUST DIVORCE HER AND GIVE HER ALSO THE KETHUBAH. WHERE HE, HOWEVER, LIVES IN ANOTHER TOWN, HE MAY KEEP [HER AS HIS WIFE, IF THE PROHIBITION WAS FOR] ONE FESTIVAL,³³  [BUT IF FOR] THREE³⁴  FESTIVALS, HE MUST DIVORCE HER AND GIVE HER ALSO HER KETHUBAH. IF A MAN FORBADE HIS WIFE BY VOW³⁵  THAT SHE SHALL NOT VISIT A HOUSE OF MOURNING OR A HOUSE OF FEASTING, HE MUST DIVORCE HER AND GIVE HER ALSO HER KETHUBAH, BECAUSE THEREBY HE HAS CLOSED [PEOPLE'S DOORS] AGAINST HER. IF HE PLEADS, HOWEVER, [THAT HIS ACTION] WAS DUE TO SOME OTHER CAUSE³⁶  HE IS PERMITTED [TO FORBID HER]. IF HE SAID TO HER: '[THERE SHALL BE NO VOW] PROVIDED THAT YOU TELL³⁶  SO-AND-SO WHAT YOU HAVE TOLD ME' OR 'WHAT I HAVE TOLD YOU' OR 'THAT YOU SHALL FILL³⁶  AND POUR OUT ON THE RUBBISH HEAP', HE MUST DIVORCE HER AND GIVE HER ALSO HER KETHUBAH.

GEMARA. This, surely, is self-contradictory. You said, HE MAY KEEP [HER AS HIS WIFE, IF THE PROHIBITION WAS FOR] ONE FESTIVAL, which implies that if it was for two festivals he must divorce her and give her also her kethubah. But read the concluding clause, [IF FOR] THREE FESTIVALS HE MUST DIVORCE HER AND GIVE HER ALSO HER KETHUBAH, from which it follows, does it not, that if it was for two only he may keep [her as his wife]?³⁷  Abaye replied: The concluding clause refers to a priest's wife, and it represents the view of R. Judah.³⁸  Rabbah b. 'Ulla said: There is no contradiction, for one³⁹  refers to a woman who was anxious [to visit her parents home]⁴⁰  and the other applies to one who was not anxious.⁴¹

Then⁴²  was I in his eyes as one that found peace,⁴³  R.⁴⁴  Johanan⁴⁵  interpreted: like a bride⁴⁶  who was found faultless⁴⁷  in the house of her father-in-law⁴⁸  and she is anxious to go and tell of her success⁴⁹  at her paternal home.⁵⁰

And it shall be at that day, saith the Lord, that thou shalt call me Ishi,⁵¹  and shalt not call me Ba'ali,⁵²  R. Johanan interpreted: Like a bride in the house of her father-in-law⁵³  and not like a bride in her paternal home.⁵⁴

IF A MAN FORBADE HIS WIFE BY VOW etc. One can well understand that in respect [of her prohibition to enter] A HOUSE OF FEASTING

1. Such vows only may be annulled by a husband. Now, in view of this ruling of R. Jose (v. supra n. 5), how could it be said that according to his opinion a husband may annul vows against the use of any adornments?
2. In the case of adornments referred to by R. Jose in our Mishnah.
3. Lit., 'things between him and her' (sc. husband and wife): a powder, for instance, for the removal of superfluous hair from unexposed parts of the body. A woman's abstention from the use of such kinds of cosmetics or adornments are regarded as things affecting their intimate relations and such vows may well be annulled by a husband, v. Ned. 79b.
4. Ned. 81a.
5. Proverb: i.e., one is not injured by an element to which one is accustomed. The husband being accustomed to his wife, cannot be harmed by her refusal to look after her body (as defined n. 8); 'pit' (Rashi) or 'rubble', 'loose ground' (Jast.). Since the intimate relations of husband and wife are not affected by such a vow, the husband has no right to invalidate them. How, then, can be be penalized in the case of the adornments spoken of in our Mishnah?
6. The annulment of such a vow is within the right of a husband.
7. By a vow.
8. Because it is not within her power to make a vow against a duty that is incumbent upon her as a married woman.
9. By a vow.
10. Such a vow is within her power to make, since it relates to her own gratification.
11. Though he is under no obligation to respect it.
12. Cf. supra note 1.
13. If according to R. Jose the only reason why a husband has the right to annul his wife's vows in connection with adornments (v. our Mishnah) is because she has made her marital intercourse dependent upon them.
14. Why then is a husband entitled to annul such vows?
15. If she were to dispense with her adornments.
16. An insult which she would not be able to bear, and in consequence of which she would resume the use of adornments and thus affect her marital relationship. Cf. supra note 1.
17. As in the case where a man forbade his wife by a vow to have intercourse with him (supra 61b).
18. Why then has it been stated that HE MUST DIVORCE HER AND GIVE HER THE KETHUBAH forthwith?
19. The respective rulings of Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel, which allow a certain period before a divorce can be enforced.
20. When he made his vow.
21. Lit., 'now'.
22. And seek the help of an authority in obtaining its disallowance.
23. And so confirmed it.
24. She is, therefore, anxious to leave him at once. Hence the ruling in our Mishnah (cf. p. 443, n. 13).
25. During which a wife must put up with the deprivation of her adornments, and be unable to demand a divorce.
26. Only where the prohibition has been extended to a longer period can the husband be compelled to divorce his wife and to give her also her kethubah.
27. I.e., until the major festival next to the day on which the vow was made. The major festivals are Passover, Pentecost and Tabernacles.
28. Lit., 'for so'.
29. Lit., 'what is the difference?'
30. If, therefore, the prohibition imposed upon her by the vow is for less than that period, she does not suffer much by the deprivation of her cosmetics.
31. He confirmed a vow she bad made to that effect. Though a husband has no right to impose such a vow upon his wife, be may confirm it by remaining silent when he hears that she has imposed such a vow upon herself; v. Num. XXX, 7ff; or, he vowed to abstain from his wife should she go to her father's house; cf. supra p. 433, n. 7.
32. Her father. [Var. lec. 'IF THEY', v. Rashi].
33. It was customary for daughters to visit their parents living in another town on the occasion of each major festival (v. p. 444. n. 7), and it was laid down that no hardship was involved if one such visit was omitted.
34. The question of two is discussed infra.
35. V. p. 444, n. 11.
36. This is explained in the Gemara.
37. How then are the two clauses to be reconciled?
38. In the Mishnah supra 70a.
39. Lit., 'here', the first clause which implies that if the prohibition is to last for two festivals the woman must be divorced and is to receive her kethubah.
40. [H], pass. particip. Kal of [H], 'to pursue', v. next note. In the first year of her married life a woman is anxious, as soon as the first festival after her marriage approaches, to pay a visit to her paternal home where she looks forward to the enjoyment of recounting her novel experiences in her husband's home. If she is prevented by a vow from paying the visit at the first festival she must be given the opportunity of paying a visit not later than at the second festival. Hence if the vow is for the first two festivals, she is entitled to a divorce and to her kethubah also.
41. Where she is homesick and always longing to visit her parents, two festivals are considered a hardship. If she shews no such signs of homesickness there is no hardship involved unless the inhibition is for at least three festivals (Rashi). Tosaf. s.v. itf explains differently: A woman who failed to visit her paternal home on the occasion of the first festival after her marriage is presumed to be fairly indifferent to such visits, and to be suffering no undue hardship by postponing her visit for another two festivals.
42. Var. lec., according to Tosaf. 'for it is written, l'hen'.
43. Cant. VIII, 10.
44. Var. lec., according to Tosaf. 'and R.' etc.
45. Var. lec 'Jonathan'.
46. Sc. a woman in the first year of her married life.
47. [H] (lit.. 'whole', 'perfect') is of the same root as [H] (peace) in the text cited.
48. Where she lives with her husband.
49. Lit., 'her praise'
50. Cf. supra p. 445, n. 8.
51. [H], 'my husband', analogous to [H] 'matrimony', the term implying that the marital union between the parties is complete.
52. Hosea II, 18. [H] signifies 'my master', or 'my husband' in the sense that the man is lord over his wife.
53. I.e., after her marriage when her union with her husband is complete. (V. supra n. 10).
54. When her future husband is still her ba'al (master) and not her Ish (husband). Israel's relation to God, the prophet assures the people, will be intimate like that of the first mentioned bride and not cautious, reserved and uncertain like that of the latter.