Babylonian Talmud: Tractate Kethuboth

Folio 55a

in respect of amelioration,¹  an oath,²  and the Sabbatical year,³  in respect of him who assigned all his property to his sons,⁴  or the recovery of payment out of real estate and from the worst part of it,⁵  also in respect of [the law of a widow] while in her father's house,⁶  and of the kethubah for male children.⁷

It was stated: The kethubah for the male children,⁸  [the scholars of] Pumbeditha⁹  ruled, may not be collected from sold or mortgaged property,¹⁰  for we have learned,⁸  'They shall inherit';¹¹  and the scholars of¹²  Matha Mehasia¹³  ruled: It may be collected from sold or mortgaged property, for we have learned,⁸  'They shall take'.¹⁴  The law, however, is that it may not be collected from sold or mortgaged property, since we have learned,⁸  'They shall inherit'.¹¹

Movables¹⁵  which are available¹⁶  [may be collected]¹⁷  without an oath;¹⁸  but if they are not available,¹⁹  [the kethubah may, the scholars of] Pumbeditha ruled, [be collected]²⁰  without an oath¹⁸  and the scholars²¹  of Matha Mehasia ruled: Only with an oath. The law [is that they may be collected] without an oath.

If [her husband] has set aside for her a plot of land [defining it] by its four boundaries²²  [she²³  may collect from it] without an oath;²⁴  but if [he only defined it] by one boundary, [the scholars of] Pumbeditha ruled [that collection²⁵  may be made from it] without an oath,²⁴  but the scholars of Matha Mehasia ruled: Only with an oath.²⁶  The law, however, is that collection²⁵  may be effected without an oath.²²  If a man said to witnesses, 'Write out [a deed],²⁷  sign it and give it to a certain person',²⁸  and they took from him symbolic possession there is no need²⁹  to consult him.³⁰  [If, however,] no symbolic possession was taken, [the scholars of] Pumbeditha ruled, there is no need²⁹  to consult him,³⁰  but the scholars of Matha Mehasia ruled: It is necessary to consult him. The law is that it is necessary to consult him.

R. ELEAZAR B. AZARIAH etc. It was stated: Rab and R. Nathan [differed]. One maintained that the halachah was in agreement with R. Eleazar b. Azariah and the other maintained that the halachah was not in agreement with R. Eleazar b. Azariah. You may conclude that it was R. Nathan who maintained that the halachah was in agreement with R. Eleazar b. Azariah³¹  since R. Nathan was heard [elsewhere] to follow [the rule of] assumption,³²  he³³  having stated that the halachah was in agreement with R. Simeon Shezuri in the case of a man dangerously ill³⁴

1. Of the estate of the husband after his death. As the statutory kethubah cannot be recovered from such amelioration (v. Bek. 5lb) so cannot the additional jointure either.
2. A woman must take an oath in respect of her additional jointure in all cases where she takes an oath in respect of her statutory kethubah (infra 87a).
3. In which all debts must be released (v. Deut. XV. Iff) but not the obligation of a kethubah (v. Git. 48b). The exemption applies to both the statutory kethubah and the additional jointure.
4. And left any fraction of land for his wife. Thereby she loses her kethubah (v. B.B. 132a) and her additional jointure also.
5. These restriction apply to the additional jointure as well as to the statutory kethubah (v. Git. 48b).
6. She may claim her kethubah within twenty-five years only (v. infra 104a). This applies also to her additional jointure. There is no time limit in the case of a widow who lives in her late husband's house.
7. The children are entitled to their mother's additional jointure just as they are entitled to her statutory kethubah and to the dowry, which her father gave to her husband on the occasion of their marriage, and which also forms a part of the kethubah obligations of a husband.
8. V. Mishnah supra 52b.
9. [H] (lit., 'mouth of Beditha', one of the canals of the Euphrates), was a Babylonian town famous as a Jewish centre of learning.
10. Of the widow's late husband.
11. One inherits free assets only.
12. Lit., 'sons of'.
13. [H] is a suburb of Sura in Babylonia.
14. Instead of they shall inherit'. This implies that the children are entitled to the kethubah as a gift made to them by their father at the time of his marriage with the right to seize his property wherever it may be found.
15. Pledged by a husband for the kethubah of his wife.
16. At the time of the man's death.
17. By the widow who, in other circumstances, is required to take an oath to the effect that her late husband had not given her some money or objects of value as a security for her kethubah.
18. Since it is definitely known what objects of value had been set aside for her kethuhah there is no reason to suspect that any other objects or money also had been secretly deposited with her.
19. If, e.g., they were lost.
20. From the landed property of the deceased, since all of it is legally pledged for the kethubah of one's wife.
21. Lit., 'sons'.
22. As a special security for her kethubah.
23. When her husband dies.
24. Cf. supra p. 325, n. 14, mutatis mutandis.
25. V. loc. cit. n. 13.
26. As only one of the four boundaries had been indicated the plot of land cannot be regarded as a definite security, and the suspicion may be entertained that her husband may have given her some private deposit as a security for her kethubah (cf. supra p. 325, n. 13).
27. E.g., of a gift of land.
28. Lit., 'to him'.
29. Before the deed is written (Rashi).
30. Whether his instructions were seriously meant or whether he has not since changed his mind (cf. Rashi). According to some authorities the consultation relates to the question of entering a clause pledging the donor's property (cf. Tosaf. s.v. [H]).
31. Whose opinion in our Mishnah is based on the assumption that THE MAN PROMISED … WITH THE SOLE OBJECT etc.
32. Wherever a man did not specify his intention or motive.
33. Cur. edd. read 'R. Nathan'. In Hul. 75b the reading is 'R. Jonathan', and in Men. 30b 'R. Johanan'.
34. Who gave instructions for a letter of divorce to be written for his wife. The document may be delivered to the woman, even though its delivery was not mentioned in the instructions, because it is assumed that the dying man intended it for this purpose (v. Git. 65b).

and in that of terumah¹  of the tithe of demai²  produce.³  But does not Rab, however, follow [the rule of] assumption? Surely it was stated: As to the gift of a dying man⁴  [in the deed of] which was recorded [symbolic] acquisition, the school of Rab in the name of Rab reported [that the testator] has [thereby] made him⁵  ride on two harnessed horses;⁶  but Samuel said: I do not know what decision to give on the matter. 'The school of Rab in the name of Rab reported [that the testator] has [thereby] made him ride on two harnessed horses', for it is like the gift of a man in good health,⁷  and it is also like the gift of a dying man.⁸  'It is like the gift of a man in good health', in that, if he recovered, he cannot retract,⁷  and 'it is like the gift of a dying man' in that, if he said that his loan⁹  [shall be given] to X, his loan [is to he given] to X.¹⁰  'But Samuel said: I do not know what decision to give on the matter', since it is possible that he¹¹  decided not to transfer possession to him¹²  except through the deed,¹³  and no [possession by means of a] deed [may be acquired] after [the testator's] death!¹⁴

1. V. Glos.
2. V. Glos.
3. V. Dem. IV, 1. In this as in the previous case the rule of assumption is followed. Cf. p. 326, n. 10.
4. Who distributed all his estate. V. B.B. Sonc. ed. p. 658. n. 2. The verbal assignment of a dying man is valid and requires no deed or formal acquisition.
5. The recipient.
6. I.e., his claim has a double force: That of the gift of a dying man and that of legal acquisition. [H], pl. of [H] 'a harnessed or galloping horse'.
7. Owing to the symbolic acquisition that took place.
8. Cf. supra note 3.
9. Lit., 'my loan', a debt which someone owes him.
10. Although the money was not at that time in his possession and the gift was not made in the presence of the three parties concerned (v. B.B. 144a).
11. By the unnecessary symbolic acquisition. V. infra n. 12.
12. The donee.
13. Not merely by virtue of the legal validity of his instructions (v. supra note 3).
14. Hence it was difficult for Samuel to give a decision on the matter (v. B.B. Sonc. ed. p. 658, n. 11). As Rab, however, definitely ruled in favour of the donee on the assumption that the donor 'made him ride on two harnessed horses', it follows that Rab is guided by the rule of assumption. How then could it be implied supra that it was Rab who held that the halachah was not in agreement with R. Eleazar b. Azariah.